design: multi-person / family / caregiver data sharing under zero-knowledge encryption is unsolved
✅ Phase C merged (PR #15 → main, commit dabbea2)
Hard revoke / re-key is on main. An owner can rotate a profile's DEK — re-encrypting all the profile's data client-side under a fresh…
feat: hard revoke / re-key (Phase C, #3)
code: remove dead AccessClaims struct in backend/src/auth/claims.rs
Closed via PR #14 (merged). backend/src/auth/claims.rs is deleted; the JWT ADR's open item is marked done. The live Claims/RefreshClaims in backend/src/auth/jwt.rs are the only definitions.
chore: remove dead AccessClaims struct (#5)
code: remove dead AccessClaims struct in backend/src/auth/claims.rs
design: multi-person / family / caregiver data sharing under zero-knowledge encryption is unsolved
Phase C landed (PR #15, not yet merged)
feat/3-phase-c-rekey implements hard revoke / re-key (ADR §4). An owner can rotate a profile's DEK: generate a fresh key, re-encrypt…
fix(security): enforce ownership on medication/appointment write paths (#12)
security: medication/appointment write + delete paths don't check ownership