Implements the 3-tier key model from the multi-person sharing ADR: each account owns multiple profiles (a person or pet — a 'subject of care'), and each profile has its own random AES-256-GCM DEK. All health data is now encrypted under the active profile's DEK, not the account-wide DEK. The account DEK wraps each profile DEK; the server stores only opaque wrapped blobs. Per the ADR: DB wipe, no migration (no real user data). This unblocks Phase B (sharing) — there is now a per-profile key to wrap to a recipient's X25519 public key. Backend: - Profile model: owner_account_id, kind (human/pet), relationship, wrapped_profile_dek + iv. ProfileRepository gains find_all_by_owner, find_by_profile_id_owned, update_profile, delete_profile — all ownership-scoped. - Profile handlers: GET/POST /api/profiles, GET/PUT/DELETE /api/profiles/:id. Removed /api/profiles/me. Renamed users.rs get_profile/update_profile (the /api/users/me handlers) to get_account/update_account to resolve a name collision. - Register accepts default_profile_* fields and auto-creates the self profile when the client provides a wrapped profile DEK. - HealthStatistic + Appointment gain profile_id and ?profile_id= filtering (health stats previously had no profile binding). - New profile_tests.rs: multi-profile CRUD + ownership isolation + register-with-default-profile. Fixed the zk health-stat test to send the now-required profile_id. Frontend: - crypto/keys.ts: generateProfileDek, wrapProfileDek, unwrapProfileDek + in-memory per-profile DEK store with an active-profile concept. - useProfileStore rewritten: holds profiles[], activeProfileId; loadProfiles unwraps each profile DEK; create/update/delete. All 11 encrypt/decrypt sites switched from getEncKey() to getActiveProfileDek(). load actions pass ?profile_id= so only the active profile's rows come back. - ProfileEditor rewritten for the new store (edit active profile, create/delete). New ProfileSwitcher in the Dashboard AppBar. - MedicationManager / AppointmentsManager use the active profile id instead of the hardcoded profile_<user_id>. - 2 new crypto tests for per-profile DEK isolation; updated store + component tests for the active-profile-DEK model. Verification: backend cargo build/clippy/fmt green, tests compile (integration tests run in CI — Mongo is fixed there). Frontend tsc clean, 30/30 tests pass. Closes nothing yet (Phase B/C/D remain). Refs #3.
284 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript
284 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript
import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
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import {
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setupEncryption,
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unlockWithPassword,
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unlockWithRecovery,
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rewrapDek,
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encryptJson,
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decryptJson,
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encrypt,
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decrypt,
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setEncKey,
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clearEncKey,
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hasEncKey,
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generateIdentityKeyPair,
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wrapIdentityPrivateKey,
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unwrapIdentityPrivateKey,
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setIdentityPrivate,
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clearIdentityPrivate,
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hasIdentityPrivate,
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generateProfileDek,
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wrapProfileDek,
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unwrapProfileDek,
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setProfileDek,
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getProfileDek,
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clearProfileDeks,
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} from './index';
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/** X25519 in Web Crypto is a recent addition (Node 16+, modern browsers). Some
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* test runtimes (older jsdom/Node) may not implement it; detect once and skip
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* the identity-keypair tests rather than fail spuriously. */
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async function x25519Supported(): Promise<boolean> {
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try {
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await crypto.subtle.generateKey(
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{ name: 'ECDH', namedCurve: 'X25519' },
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true,
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['deriveBits'],
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);
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return true;
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} catch {
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return false;
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}
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}
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describe('zero-knowledge crypto lifecycle', () => {
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const password = 'my-secret-password';
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const recoveryPhrase = 'my-recovery-phrase';
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const sampleData = { name: 'Aspirin', dosage: '100mg', frequency: 'daily' };
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it('full lifecycle: setup → encrypt → unlock → decrypt → recover → rewrap', async () => {
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// 1. Setup (register): generate DEK, wrap under password + recovery.
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const setup = await setupEncryption(password, recoveryPhrase);
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expect(setup.dek).toBeDefined();
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expect(setup.passwordWrappedDek.data).not.toBe('');
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expect(setup.recoveryWrappedDek).toBeDefined();
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expect(setup.recoveryKekHash).toBeDefined();
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// 2. Encrypt data with the DEK.
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const encrypted = await encryptJson(sampleData, setup.dek);
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// Verify it's ciphertext, not plaintext.
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expect(encrypted.data).not.toContain('Aspirin');
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expect(encrypted.iv).not.toBe('');
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// 3. Decrypt with the same DEK — round-trip.
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const decrypted = await decryptJson<typeof sampleData>(encrypted, setup.dek);
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expect(decrypted.name).toBe('Aspirin');
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expect(decrypted.dosage).toBe('100mg');
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// 4. Simulate page reload: DEK is lost.
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clearEncKey();
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expect(hasEncKey()).toBe(false);
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// 5. Unlock with password (the unlock screen flow).
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const unlockResult = await unlockWithPassword(password, setup.passwordWrappedDek);
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setEncKey(unlockResult.dek);
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expect(hasEncKey()).toBe(true);
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// 6. The unlocked DEK can decrypt the same data.
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const decryptedAfterUnlock = await decryptJson<typeof sampleData>(
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encrypted,
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unlockResult.dek,
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);
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expect(decryptedAfterUnlock.name).toBe('Aspirin');
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// 7. Recover via recovery phrase (forgot password flow).
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clearEncKey();
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const recoveredDek = await unlockWithRecovery(
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recoveryPhrase,
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setup.recoveryWrappedDek!,
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);
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const decryptedAfterRecovery = await decryptJson<typeof sampleData>(
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encrypted,
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recoveredDek,
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);
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expect(decryptedAfterRecovery.name).toBe('Aspirin');
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// 8. Rewrap under a new password (post-recovery).
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const newPassword = 'my-new-password';
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const rewrapped = await rewrapDek(recoveredDek, newPassword);
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const unlockWithNew = await unlockWithPassword(newPassword, rewrapped);
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const decryptedAfterRewrap = await decryptJson<typeof sampleData>(
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encrypted,
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unlockWithNew.dek,
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);
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expect(decryptedAfterRewrap.name).toBe('Aspirin');
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clearEncKey();
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});
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it('wrong password fails to unlock', async () => {
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const setup = await setupEncryption(password);
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await expect(
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unlockWithPassword('wrong-password', setup.passwordWrappedDek),
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).rejects.toThrow();
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});
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it('wrong recovery phrase fails to unlock', async () => {
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const setup = await setupEncryption(password, recoveryPhrase);
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await expect(
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unlockWithRecovery('wrong-phrase', setup.recoveryWrappedDek!),
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).rejects.toThrow();
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});
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it('data encrypted under one key cannot be decrypted by another', async () => {
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const setupA = await setupEncryption('user-a-password');
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const setupB = await setupEncryption('user-b-password');
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const encrypted = await encryptJson(sampleData, setupA.dek);
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// User B's key cannot decrypt User A's data.
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await expect(decryptJson(encrypted, setupB.dek)).rejects.toThrow();
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});
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});
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describe('account X25519 identity keypair (Phase A1)', () => {
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const password = 'my-secret-password';
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it('full lifecycle: generate → wrap → unlock DEK → unwrap → deriveBits', async () => {
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if (!(await x25519Supported())) {
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console.log('[crypto] skipped (X25519 unsupported in this runtime)');
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return;
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}
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// 1. Register: set up the account DEK and generate the identity keypair.
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const setup = await setupEncryption(password);
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const { publicKey, privateKey } = await generateIdentityKeyPair();
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expect(publicKey).not.toBe('');
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setIdentityPrivate(privateKey);
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expect(hasIdentityPrivate()).toBe(true);
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// 2. Wrap the private key under the account DEK and "store" it.
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const wrapped = await wrapIdentityPrivateKey(privateKey, setup.dek);
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expect(wrapped.data).not.toBe('');
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// 3. Simulate page reload: both keys are lost from memory.
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clearIdentityPrivate();
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expect(hasIdentityPrivate()).toBe(false);
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// 4. Unlock the DEK with the password (unlock screen flow).
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const { dek } = await unlockWithPassword(password, setup.passwordWrappedDek);
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// 5. Unwrap the identity private key from the stored wrapped form.
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const recovered = await unwrapIdentityPrivateKey(wrapped, dek);
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setIdentityPrivate(recovered);
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expect(hasIdentityPrivate()).toBe(true);
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// 6. The recovered private key is a USABLE X25519 key: it can derive a
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// shared secret against the original public key. Import the public key
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// and ECDH-derive — this proves the round-trip preserved a working key.
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const pubBytes = Uint8Array.from(atob(publicKey), (c) => c.charCodeAt(0));
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const pubKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
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'raw',
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pubBytes as BufferSource,
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{ name: 'ECDH', namedCurve: 'X25519' },
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false,
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[],
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);
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const sharedSecret = await crypto.subtle.deriveBits(
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{ name: 'ECDH', public: pubKey },
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recovered,
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256,
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);
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expect(sharedSecret.byteLength).toBe(32);
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clearIdentityPrivate();
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});
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it('a wrapped private key cannot be unwrapped with the wrong DEK', async () => {
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if (!(await x25519Supported())) {
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console.log('[crypto] skipped (X25519 unsupported in this runtime)');
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return;
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}
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// DEK for account A; a different DEK for account B.
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const setupA = await setupEncryption('user-a-password');
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const setupB = await setupEncryption('user-b-password');
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const { privateKey } = await generateIdentityKeyPair();
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const wrapped = await wrapIdentityPrivateKey(privateKey, setupA.dek);
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// User B's DEK cannot unwrap user A's identity private key.
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await expect(unwrapIdentityPrivateKey(wrapped, setupB.dek)).rejects.toThrow();
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});
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it('two identity keypairs derive different shared secrets with the same peer', async () => {
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if (!(await x25519Supported())) {
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console.log('[crypto] skipped (X25519 unsupported in this runtime)');
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return;
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}
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// Sanity: distinct keypairs must produce distinct ECDH outputs.
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const peer = await generateIdentityKeyPair();
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const peerPubBytes = Uint8Array.from(atob(peer.publicKey), (c) => c.charCodeAt(0));
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const peerPub = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
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'raw',
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peerPubBytes as BufferSource,
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{ name: 'ECDH', namedCurve: 'X25519' },
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false,
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[],
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);
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const a = await generateIdentityKeyPair();
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const b = await generateIdentityKeyPair();
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const secretA = await crypto.subtle.deriveBits(
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{ name: 'ECDH', public: peerPub },
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a.privateKey,
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256,
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);
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const secretB = await crypto.subtle.deriveBits(
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{ name: 'ECDH', public: peerPub },
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b.privateKey,
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256,
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);
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const aHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(secretA)).map((x) => x.toString(16)).join('');
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const bHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(secretB)).map((x) => x.toString(16)).join('');
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expect(aHex).not.toBe(bHex);
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});
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});
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describe('per-profile DEK isolation (Phase A2)', () => {
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const password = 'my-secret-password';
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it('two profiles get distinct DEKs, each wrapped under the account DEK', async () => {
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// One account DEK (unlocked from the password).
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const setup = await setupEncryption(password);
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const accountDek = setup.dek;
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// Two profiles, each with its own random DEK.
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const childDek = await generateProfileDek();
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const petDek = await generateProfileDek();
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// Each profile DEK is wrapped under the account DEK for storage.
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const childWrapped = await wrapProfileDek(childDek, accountDek);
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const petWrapped = await wrapProfileDek(petDek, accountDek);
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// Both wrapped blobs decrypt cleanly under the account DEK.
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const childUnwrapped = await unwrapProfileDek(childWrapped, accountDek);
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const petUnwrapped = await unwrapProfileDek(petWrapped, accountDek);
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expect(childUnwrapped).toBeDefined();
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expect(petUnwrapped).toBeDefined();
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// Data encrypted under the child profile's DEK cannot be decrypted by the
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// pet profile's DEK (and vice versa) — this is the per-profile isolation
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// guarantee that makes the parent/child and pet cases safe.
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const childData = await encrypt('child-medication', childDek);
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await expect(decrypt(childData, petDek)).rejects.toThrow();
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const petData = await encrypt('pet-weight', petDek);
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await expect(decrypt(petData, childDek)).rejects.toThrow();
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// ...but each decrypts with its own key.
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expect(await decrypt(childData, childDek)).toBe('child-medication');
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expect(await decrypt(petData, petDek)).toBe('pet-weight');
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});
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it('the in-memory profile-DEK store maps profile ids to DEKs', async () => {
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const childDek = await generateProfileDek();
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const petDek = await generateProfileDek();
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setProfileDek('profile_child', childDek);
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setProfileDek('profile_pet', petDek);
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// Each id resolves to the DEK that was stored under it; unknown ids resolve to null.
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expect(getProfileDek('profile_child')).toBe(childDek);
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expect(getProfileDek('profile_pet')).toBe(petDek);
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expect(getProfileDek('profile_unknown')).toBeNull();
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// Clearing drops everything.
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clearProfileDeks();
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expect(getProfileDek('profile_child')).toBeNull();
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});
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});
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