normogen/backend/src/middleware/auth.rs
goose cf6fcd4ef2 fix(backend): refresh-token jti + code cleanup (#15,#28,#29,#30)
Refresh-token rotation bug (found via Solaria smoke test):
* RefreshClaims now carries a unique random jti (UUID v4). Without it, two
  refresh tokens issued in the same second (e.g. on rotation) were byte-identical
  — breaking rotation, colliding on the tokenHash unique index, and making a
  stolen old token indistinguishable from the new one. Every refresh token is
  now unique regardless of issue time. Added a unit test asserting consecutive
  tokens differ.

Code cleanup (review items):
* #15: removed unused deps tower_governor, slog, thiserror (zero refs in src/).
* #30: deleted leftover src/main.rs.restore (a stale git-error-message backup).
* #28: removed the 9 single-line-comment stub files under src/db/ (appointment,
  family, health_data, lab_result, medication, profile, permission, share, user)
  and their mod declarations; nothing referenced them, real logic lives in
  mongodb_impl.rs/init.rs.
* #29: stripped 61 broad module-level #![allow(...)] suppressions across src/.
  Fixed the surfaced warnings instead: 4 unused 'claims' extractor bindings ->
  _claims; removed dead OpenFDAService.client/base_url fields + the never-called
  query_drug_events method + unused HashMap/reqwest imports; applied clippy's
  mechanical fixes (Ok(?) -> ?, Copy ObjectId clone, redundant closures,
  useless conversions); rewrote 'if let Ok(_) = x' -> 'if x.is_ok()'. Result:
  cargo build + clippy --all-targets are warning-free with no blanket allows.

Verified: fmt clean, build clean, clippy 0 warnings, 19 unit tests pass
(was 18; +1 jti-uniqueness test).
2026-06-27 20:57:24 -03:00

66 lines
1.9 KiB
Rust

use crate::auth::jwt::Claims;
use crate::config::AppState;
use axum::{
extract::{Request, State},
http::StatusCode,
middleware::Next,
response::Response,
};
use mongodb::bson::oid::ObjectId;
pub async fn jwt_auth_middleware(
State(state): State<AppState>,
mut req: Request,
next: Next,
) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {
let headers = req.headers();
// Extract Authorization header
let auth_header = headers
.get("Authorization")
.and_then(|h| h.to_str().ok())
.ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
// Check Bearer token format
if !auth_header.starts_with("Bearer ") {
return Err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
}
let token = &auth_header[7..]; // Remove "Bearer " prefix
// Verify signature and expiry.
let claims = state
.jwt_service
.validate_token(token)
.map_err(|_| StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
// Reject tokens whose version is stale (e.g. issued before a password
// change). The user's current version is cached briefly so we don't hit
// Mongo on every request; a missing user (deleted) also means 401.
let user_oid = ObjectId::parse_str(&claims.sub).map_err(|_| StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
let current_version = state
.token_version_cache
.get_or_load(&user_oid, &state.db)
.await
.map_err(|_| StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
match current_version {
Some(v) if v == claims.token_version => {}
_ => return Err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED),
}
// Add claims to request extensions for handlers to use
req.extensions_mut().insert(claims);
Ok(next.run(req).await)
}
// Extension method to extract claims from request
pub trait RequestClaimsExt {
fn claims(&self) -> Option<&Claims>;
}
impl RequestClaimsExt for Request {
fn claims(&self) -> Option<&Claims> {
self.extensions().get::<Claims>()
}
}