normogen/backend/src/app.rs
goose bf5aeedbc2
Some checks failed
Lint and Build / format (pull_request) Successful in 40s
Lint and Build / clippy (pull_request) Successful in 1m56s
Lint and Build / build (pull_request) Successful in 3m47s
Lint and Build / test (pull_request) Failing after 3m51s
feat: hard revoke / re-key (Phase C, #3)
An owner can now rotate a profile's DEK — generating a fresh key,
re-encrypting all the profile's data under it (client-side), and
re-wrapping to the owner share + kept recipients. A revoked recipient's
cached old DEK stops working, closing the soft-revoke window the ADR
requires for graduation / suspected compromise.

The server stays a blind store: it sees opaque old→new ciphertext blobs
flow through, never the DEK or plaintext. No backend crypto.

Backend:
- ProfileRepository::update_wrapped_dek — rotate the owner share
  (account-wrapped profile DEK), owner-scoped.
- ProfileShareRepository::find_active_for_profile +
  delete_for_profile_excluding — list current recipients and hard-delete
  omitted ones.
- POST /api/profiles/:id/rekey: validates each submitted envelope
  against existing active shares (no smuggling new recipients in via
  rekey), rotates the owner share, upserts recipient envelopes with
  fresh ephemeral ECDH keys, hard-deletes omitted recipients.
- rekey_tests.rs: rotation, hard-revoke-from-recipient-view, no-share
  rejection, non-owner rejection, revoke-all.

Frontend:
- useProfileStore.rekeyProfile: fetches all profile data, re-encrypts
  each row under a new DEK (resume-safe — rows already on the new DEK
  are skipped), builds fresh ECDH envelopes per kept recipient, commits
  via POST /rekey, swaps the in-memory DEK.
- ProfileSharing: 'Rotate encryption key (hard revoke)' action with a
  strong confirmation dialog explaining the cost and the resume-safe
  retry.

Best-effort + resumable retry (per design decision); no server-side
write lock.

Verification: backend cargo build/clippy (-D warnings)/fmt clean, tests
compile (integration tests run in CI — Mongo is fixed there). Frontend
tsc clean, 31/31 tests pass.

⚠️ Backend integration tests not run locally (no Mongo in this sandbox);
CI will run them — I'll fix any failures.

Admin-initiated rekey (ADR §5c reserves the permission) is out of scope
— handler is owner-only until admin shares are creatable in Phase D.
Refs #3.
2026-07-19 15:15:39 -03:00

125 lines
6.2 KiB
Rust

//! Router assembly. Extracted from `main.rs` so integration tests can build the
//! exact same app (routes, middleware, layers) in process against a test
//! database instead of a live server.
use axum::{
routing::{delete, get, post, put},
Router,
};
use tower::ServiceBuilder;
use tower_http::{cors::CorsLayer, trace::TraceLayer};
use crate::config::AppState;
use crate::handlers;
use crate::middleware;
/// Compose the full Axum app: all public + protected routes, the JWT auth
/// layer on protected routes, and the global middleware stack (client-IP
/// resolution, security headers, rate limit, tracing, CORS).
///
/// `main.rs` calls this and wraps it in `into_make_service_with_connect_info`
/// before serving; tests call it and drive it with `oneshot`/`RouterExt`.
pub fn build_app(state: AppState) -> Router {
// Build public routes (no auth required)
let public_routes = Router::new()
.route(
"/health",
get(handlers::health_check).head(handlers::health_check),
)
.route("/ready", get(handlers::ready_check))
.route("/api/auth/register", post(handlers::register))
.route("/api/auth/login", post(handlers::login))
.route("/api/auth/refresh", post(handlers::refresh))
.route("/api/auth/logout", post(handlers::logout))
.route(
"/api/auth/recover-password",
post(handlers::recover_password),
)
.route("/api/auth/recovery-info", get(handlers::recovery_info))
// Recipient identity public key lookup (Phase B). Public keys are not
// secret, so this is unauthenticated — mirrors recovery-info.
.route("/api/users/public-key", get(handlers::get_public_key));
// Build protected routes (auth required)
let protected_routes = Router::new()
// User profile management
.route("/api/users/me", get(handlers::get_account))
.route("/api/users/me", put(handlers::update_account))
.route("/api/users/me", delete(handlers::delete_account))
.route("/api/users/me/change-password", post(handlers::change_password))
// User settings
.route("/api/users/me/settings", get(handlers::get_settings))
.route("/api/users/me/settings", put(handlers::update_settings))
// Profile management (Phase A2 multi-profile + Phase B sharing).
// GET /api/profiles/:id is share-aware (admits recipients); the other
// profile ops remain owner-only.
.route("/api/profiles", get(handlers::list_profiles))
.route("/api/profiles", post(handlers::create_profile))
.route("/api/profiles/shared-with-me", get(handlers::list_shared_with_me))
.route("/api/profiles/:id", get(handlers::get_profile_shared_aware))
.route("/api/profiles/:id", put(handlers::update_profile))
.route("/api/profiles/:id", delete(handlers::delete_profile))
// Profile sharing (Phase B): owner manages shares; recipients read via
// the gate inside the data handlers.
.route(
"/api/profiles/:id/shares",
get(handlers::list_shares).post(handlers::create_share),
)
.route("/api/profiles/:id/shares/:recipient", delete(handlers::delete_share))
// Hard revoke / rotate the profile DEK (Phase C). Owner-only.
.route("/api/profiles/:id/rekey", post(handlers::rekey_profile))
// Session management (Phase 2.6)
.route("/api/sessions", get(handlers::get_sessions))
.route("/api/sessions/:id", delete(handlers::revoke_session))
.route("/api/sessions/all", delete(handlers::revoke_all_sessions))
// Medication management (Phase 2.7)
.route("/api/medications", post(handlers::create_medication))
.route("/api/medications", get(handlers::list_medications))
.route("/api/medications/:id", get(handlers::get_medication))
.route("/api/medications/:id", post(handlers::update_medication))
.route("/api/medications/:id/delete", post(handlers::delete_medication))
.route("/api/medications/:id/log", post(handlers::log_dose))
.route("/api/medications/:id/adherence", get(handlers::get_adherence))
// Health statistics management (Phase 2.7)
.route("/api/health-stats", post(handlers::create_health_stat))
.route("/api/health-stats", get(handlers::list_health_stats))
.route("/api/health-stats/:id", get(handlers::get_health_stat))
.route("/api/health-stats/:id", put(handlers::update_health_stat))
.route("/api/health-stats/:id", delete(handlers::delete_health_stat))
// Drug interactions (Phase 2.8)
.route("/api/interactions/check", post(handlers::check_interactions))
.route("/api/interactions/check-new", post(handlers::check_new_medication))
// Appointments
.route("/api/appointments", post(handlers::create_appointment))
.route("/api/appointments", get(handlers::list_appointments))
.route("/api/appointments/:id", get(handlers::get_appointment))
.route("/api/appointments/:id", post(handlers::update_appointment))
.route("/api/appointments/:id/delete", post(handlers::delete_appointment))
.layer(axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(
state.clone(),
middleware::jwt_auth_middleware,
));
public_routes
.merge(protected_routes)
.with_state(state.clone())
.layer(
ServiceBuilder::new()
// Resolve the client IP once and stash it for handlers/middleware
// (audit logging, account-lockout forensics).
.layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(
middleware::client_ip_middleware,
))
// Security headers (applies to all responses)
.layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(
middleware::security_headers_middleware,
))
// IP-based rate limiting (reads ClientIp from extensions).
.layer(axum::middleware::from_fn_with_state(
state.clone(),
middleware::general_rate_limit_middleware,
))
.layer(TraceLayer::new_for_http())
.layer(CorsLayer::permissive()),
)
}