Rate limiting (closes the last security gap #3): - New RateLimiter: in-memory fixed-window IP-based limiter (std::sync::Mutex HashMap, no new deps). Configurable via RATE_LIMIT_MAX (default 100) + RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECS (default 60) env vars. - general_rate_limit_middleware now reads ClientIp from request extensions and rejects with 429 + Retry-After header when over the limit. Wired via from_fn_with_state in app.rs. Lived on AppState as Arc<RateLimiter>. - Deleted the dead auth_rate_limit_middleware (never wired). - 3 unit tests (allows up to N, independent IPs, window reset). E2E crypto lifecycle test: - Full zero-knowledge round-trip against jsdom's real Web Crypto: setup → encrypt → verify ciphertext → unlock with password → decrypt → recover via phrase → rewrap under new password → decrypt. Plus wrong-password/wrong-phrase failures and cross-user key isolation. - Fixed wrapDek/unwrapDek: base64-encode raw DEK bytes (was using TextDecoder which produced non-base64), and make unwrapped DEK extractable (needed for rewrapDek to export). Verified: backend 24 tests 0 warnings; frontend 24 tests, build clean.
231 lines
8 KiB
TypeScript
231 lines
8 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Zero-knowledge key management with wrapped-DEK recovery (Phase 2).
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*
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* Key model:
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* - DEK (Data Encryption Key): a random AES-256-GCM key used to encrypt/decrypt
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* all user data. Lives in memory only.
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* - KEK (Key Encryption Key): derived from the password (or recovery phrase)
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* via PBKDF2. Used to wrap (encrypt) the DEK for storage on the server.
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*
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* The server stores two wrapped forms of the DEK:
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* - password_wrapped_dek: DEK encrypted under KEK(password)
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* - recovery_wrapped_dek: DEK encrypted under KEK(recovery_phrase)
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*
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* Recovery: derive KEK(recovery_phrase) → unwrap the DEK → re-wrap under the
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* new password's KEK. The server never holds the DEK or any KEK.
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*/
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import { encrypt, decrypt, type CipherPayload } from './cipher';
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const PBKDF2_ITERATIONS = 150_000;
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const KEY_BITS = 256;
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const encoder = new TextEncoder();
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// Domain-separation salts for each PBKDF2 purpose.
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export const AUTH_SALT = 'normogen-auth-v1';
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export const PASSWORD_KEK_SALT = 'normogen-kek-password-v1';
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export const RECOVERY_KEK_SALT = 'normogen-kek-recovery-v1';
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Low-level: PBKDF2 derivation helpers
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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async function pbkdf2DeriveBits(password: string, salt: string): Promise<ArrayBuffer> {
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const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
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'raw',
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encoder.encode(password) as BufferSource,
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'PBKDF2',
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false,
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['deriveBits'],
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);
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return crypto.subtle.deriveBits(
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{ name: 'PBKDF2', salt: encoder.encode(salt) as BufferSource, iterations: PBKDF2_ITERATIONS, hash: 'SHA-256' },
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key,
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KEY_BITS,
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);
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}
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function base64(bytes: Uint8Array): string {
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let bin = '';
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for (const b of bytes) bin += String.fromCharCode(b);
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return btoa(bin);
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}
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/** Derive the auth secret (base64) from the password — sent to the server. */
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export async function deriveAuthSecret(password: string): Promise<string> {
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const bits = await pbkdf2DeriveBits(password, AUTH_SALT);
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return base64(new Uint8Array(bits));
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}
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/** Derive a KEK (extractable AES-GCM key) from a password or recovery phrase. */
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async function deriveKEK(secret: string, salt: string): Promise<CryptoKey> {
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const bits = await pbkdf2DeriveBits(secret, salt);
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return crypto.subtle.importKey(
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'raw',
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bits,
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{ name: 'AES-GCM' },
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true, // extractable so we can export for wrapping
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['encrypt', 'decrypt'],
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);
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// DEK generation + wrapping
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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/** Generate a random AES-256-GCM DEK (extractable for wrapping). */
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export async function generateDek(): Promise<CryptoKey> {
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return crypto.subtle.generateKey(
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{ name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },
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true, // extractable so we can export raw bytes for wrapping
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['encrypt', 'decrypt'],
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);
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}
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/** Export a DEK to raw bytes, base64-encode, then encrypt (wrap) under a KEK. */
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export async function wrapDek(dek: CryptoKey, kek: CryptoKey): Promise<CipherPayload> {
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const rawDek = await crypto.subtle.exportKey('raw', dek);
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// Base64-encode the raw bytes so they survive the encrypt/decrypt string cycle.
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return encrypt(base64(new Uint8Array(rawDek)), kek);
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}
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/** Decrypt (unwrap) a wrapped DEK and import as an AES-GCM key. */
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export async function unwrapDek(payload: CipherPayload, kek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {
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const rawDekB64 = await decrypt(payload, kek);
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// The wrapped DEK was encrypted as a base64 string of the raw key bytes.
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const rawDek = Uint8Array.from(atob(rawDekB64), (c) => c.charCodeAt(0));
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return crypto.subtle.importKey(
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'raw',
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rawDek as BufferSource,
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{ name: 'AES-GCM' },
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true, // extractable so rewrapDek can export it for re-wrapping
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['encrypt', 'decrypt'],
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);
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}
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/** Re-wrap a DEK under a new KEK (for password change / post-recovery). */
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export async function rewrapDek(
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dek: CryptoKey,
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newSecret: string,
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salt: string = PASSWORD_KEK_SALT,
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): Promise<CipherPayload> {
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const newKek = await deriveKEK(newSecret, salt);
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return wrapDek(dek, newKek);
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// High-level flows
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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export interface EncryptionSetup {
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authSecret: string;
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dek: CryptoKey;
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passwordWrappedDek: CipherPayload;
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recoveryWrappedDek?: CipherPayload;
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recoveryKekHash?: string; // base64 hash of the recovery KEK proof (for server verification)
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}
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/**
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* Full setup at registration: derive auth secret, generate a DEK, wrap it under
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* the password KEK and (optionally) the recovery-phrase KEK.
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*/
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export async function setupEncryption(
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password: string,
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recoveryPhrase?: string,
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): Promise<EncryptionSetup> {
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const authSecret = await deriveAuthSecret(password);
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const dek = await generateDek();
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const passwordKek = await deriveKEK(password, PASSWORD_KEK_SALT);
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const passwordWrappedDek = await wrapDek(dek, passwordKek);
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let recoveryWrappedDek: CipherPayload | undefined;
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let recoveryKekHash: string | undefined;
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if (recoveryPhrase) {
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const recoveryKek = await deriveKEK(recoveryPhrase, RECOVERY_KEK_SALT);
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recoveryWrappedDek = await wrapDek(dek, recoveryKek);
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// A proof the server can verify: derive a separate value from the recovery
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// phrase and hash it. The server stores this hash; at recovery time the
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// client sends the derived value and the server PBKDF2-verifies it.
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// We send the recovery auth proof (base64 of a PBKDF2 derivation).
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recoveryKekHash = await deriveAuthSecret(recoveryPhrase); // reuse the auth derivation as the proof
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}
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return { authSecret, dek, passwordWrappedDek, recoveryWrappedDek, recoveryKekHash };
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}
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export interface UnlockResult {
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authSecret: string;
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dek: CryptoKey;
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}
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/**
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* At login: derive the auth secret and unwrap the DEK from the password-wrapped form.
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*/
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export async function unlockWithPassword(
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password: string,
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passwordWrappedDek: CipherPayload,
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): Promise<UnlockResult> {
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const authSecret = await deriveAuthSecret(password);
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const passwordKek = await deriveKEK(password, PASSWORD_KEK_SALT);
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const dek = await unwrapDek(passwordWrappedDek, passwordKek);
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return { authSecret, dek };
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}
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/**
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* At recovery: unwrap the DEK from the recovery-wrapped form using the recovery phrase.
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*/
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export async function unlockWithRecovery(
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recoveryPhrase: string,
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recoveryWrappedDek: CipherPayload,
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): Promise<CryptoKey> {
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const recoveryKek = await deriveKEK(recoveryPhrase, RECOVERY_KEK_SALT);
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return unwrapDek(recoveryWrappedDek, recoveryKek);
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// In-memory key store (unchanged from Phase 1)
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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let currentEncKey: CryptoKey | null = null;
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export function setEncKey(key: CryptoKey): void {
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currentEncKey = key;
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}
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export function getEncKey(): CryptoKey | null {
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return currentEncKey;
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}
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export function clearEncKey(): void {
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currentEncKey = null;
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}
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export function hasEncKey(): boolean {
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return currentEncKey !== null;
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Backward compat: the old deriveAuthAndEncKeys (Phase 1 direct-from-password
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// enc key). Kept for tests; new code uses setupEncryption/unlockWithPassword.
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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export async function deriveAuthAndEncKeys(password: string): Promise<{
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authSecret: string;
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encKey: CryptoKey;
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}> {
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const authSecret = await deriveAuthSecret(password);
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// Phase 1 derived the enc key directly from the password. For backward compat
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// with tests that don't have a wrapped DEK, derive it the old way.
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const encBits = await pbkdf2DeriveBits(password, 'normogen-enc-v1');
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const encKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
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'raw',
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encBits,
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{ name: 'AES-GCM' },
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false,
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['encrypt', 'decrypt'],
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);
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return { authSecret, encKey };
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}
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