Rate limiting (closes the last security gap #3): - New RateLimiter: in-memory fixed-window IP-based limiter (std::sync::Mutex HashMap, no new deps). Configurable via RATE_LIMIT_MAX (default 100) + RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_SECS (default 60) env vars. - general_rate_limit_middleware now reads ClientIp from request extensions and rejects with 429 + Retry-After header when over the limit. Wired via from_fn_with_state in app.rs. Lived on AppState as Arc<RateLimiter>. - Deleted the dead auth_rate_limit_middleware (never wired). - 3 unit tests (allows up to N, independent IPs, window reset). E2E crypto lifecycle test: - Full zero-knowledge round-trip against jsdom's real Web Crypto: setup → encrypt → verify ciphertext → unlock with password → decrypt → recover via phrase → rewrap under new password → decrypt. Plus wrong-password/wrong-phrase failures and cross-user key isolation. - Fixed wrapDek/unwrapDek: base64-encode raw DEK bytes (was using TextDecoder which produced non-base64), and make unwrapped DEK extractable (needed for rewrapDek to export). Verified: backend 24 tests 0 warnings; frontend 24 tests, build clean. |
||
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| mod.rs | ||