Address the four P0 security items from the project review: * token_version validation (#1): the JWT middleware now rejects access tokens whose token_version claim is stale (e.g. issued before a password change). A short-TTL (30s) in-memory cache (TokenVersionCache) avoids a Mongo lookup per request; credential changes invalidate the cache immediately on the handling instance. * Fail-fast config (#2): add APP_ENVIRONMENT (development|production). In production the server refuses to boot unless JWT_SECRET and ENCRYPTION_KEY are set to non-default values; development keeps the insecure defaults with a warning. * Real client IP in audit logs (#4): new client_ip middleware resolves the originating IP (X-Forwarded-For > X-Real-IP > ConnectInfo socket) and exposes it via a ClientIp extractor. All five hardcoded "0.0.0.0" audit calls are replaced, and the missing PasswordChanged audit event is added to change_password. axum::serve now uses into_make_service_with_connect_info. * Refresh token persistence (#5): refresh tokens are now stored hashed in MongoDB (RefreshTokenRepository) instead of an in-memory map lost on restart. Added /api/auth/refresh (with rotation + token_version check) and /api/auth/logout routes; register/login return a refresh_token; password change/recovery revoke all of a user's refresh tokens. JwtService now honors JwtConfig expiries instead of hardcoding 15min/30d, and the dead in-memory refresh store is removed. Also: wire up DatabaseInitializer (was never called), fix the refresh_tokens index to tokenHash + add an expiresAt TTL index, add sha2 dep. Rate limiting (#3) is deferred per scope; the stub remains. Verified: cargo fmt --check clean, cargo build/clippy --all-targets clean, 18 unit tests pass (9 new). Integration tests (tests/*) still need a live server — fixing them is tracked as P1. BREAKING CHANGE: AuthResponse now includes a refresh_token field.
68 lines
1.9 KiB
Rust
68 lines
1.9 KiB
Rust
#![allow(dead_code)]
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#![allow(unused_imports)]
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use crate::auth::jwt::Claims;
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use crate::config::AppState;
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use axum::{
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extract::{Request, State},
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http::StatusCode,
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middleware::Next,
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response::Response,
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};
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use mongodb::bson::oid::ObjectId;
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pub async fn jwt_auth_middleware(
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State(state): State<AppState>,
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mut req: Request,
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next: Next,
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) -> Result<Response, StatusCode> {
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let headers = req.headers();
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// Extract Authorization header
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let auth_header = headers
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.get("Authorization")
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.and_then(|h| h.to_str().ok())
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.ok_or(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
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// Check Bearer token format
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if !auth_header.starts_with("Bearer ") {
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return Err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
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}
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let token = &auth_header[7..]; // Remove "Bearer " prefix
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// Verify signature and expiry.
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let claims = state
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.jwt_service
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.validate_token(token)
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.map_err(|_| StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
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// Reject tokens whose version is stale (e.g. issued before a password
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// change). The user's current version is cached briefly so we don't hit
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// Mongo on every request; a missing user (deleted) also means 401.
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let user_oid = ObjectId::parse_str(&claims.sub).map_err(|_| StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
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let current_version = state
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.token_version_cache
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.get_or_load(&user_oid, &state.db)
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.await
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.map_err(|_| StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
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match current_version {
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Some(v) if v == claims.token_version => {}
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_ => return Err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED),
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}
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// Add claims to request extensions for handlers to use
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req.extensions_mut().insert(claims);
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Ok(next.run(req).await)
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}
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// Extension method to extract claims from request
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pub trait RequestClaimsExt {
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fn claims(&self) -> Option<&Claims>;
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}
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impl RequestClaimsExt for Request {
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fn claims(&self) -> Option<&Claims> {
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self.extensions().get::<Claims>()
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}
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}
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