# ADR: Zero-Knowledge Encryption (Phase 1)

**Status**: Implemented (Phase 1 + Phase 2)
**Date**: 2026-06-28 (Phase 1), 2026-06-29 (Phase 2)

## Context

The original design (`docs/product/encryption.md`, `docs/adr/mongodb-schema-decision.md`)
specified client-side zero-knowledge encryption: the server should never hold
plaintext user data or encryption keys. Until this change, the `EncryptedField`
type and recovery-phrase fields were aspirational scaffolding — data was always
stored and processed as plaintext JSON.

## Decision

Implement **client-side zero-knowledge encryption** using AES-256-GCM via the
browser's Web Crypto API. The server becomes a blind store: it holds opaque
ciphertext and can never decrypt user data.

### Key derivation: double PBKDF2

From the user's password, the client derives two independent values:
- **Auth secret**: `PBKDF2(password, "normogen-auth-v1", 150k iters, SHA-256)` →
  base64, sent to the server as the "password". The server PBKDF2-hashes it
  (as before).
- **Encryption key**: `PBKDF2(password, "normogen-enc-v1", 150k iters, SHA-256)` →
  AES-GCM `CryptoKey`, kept in memory only, never transmitted.

The server cannot derive the encryption key because it never sees the raw
password or the enc-domain PBKDF2 output.

### What's encrypted

- Medication data blobs (name, dosage, frequency, route, etc.)
- Appointment data blobs (title, provider, date/time, etc.)
- Profile display name

### What stays plaintext (queryable)

- IDs (`medicationId`, `appointmentId`, `userId`, `profileId`)
- Medication `active` flag (top-level, filterable)
- Appointment `status` (top-level, filterable)
- Timestamps

### In-memory key lifecycle

The encryption key lives only in browser memory for the authenticated session.
It is NOT persisted. A page reload requires re-entering the password to
re-derive it. This is the core ZK trade-off.

## Consequences

### Phase 1 limitations (documented)
- **Forgotten password = data loss.** No recovery key-wrapping yet (Phase 2).
- **Page reload requires re-authentication** to re-derive the enc key.
- No data migration was needed (no real user data existed).

### Phase 2 (future)
- ~~Recovery key-wrapping (wrap the enc key under a recovery-derived key so a
  forgotten password doesn't lose data).~~ **Done (Phase 2).**
- ~~Password-change re-wrapping (re-wrap the enc key under the new password).~~ **Done (Phase 2).**
- ~~Wrapped-DEK model (separate data-encryption key + key-encryption key).~~ **Done (Phase 2).**

## Phase 2: Wrapped-DEK Recovery (Implemented)

Phase 2 introduced the wrapped-DEK model so a forgotten password doesn't lose
all encrypted data:

- A **random DEK** (data encryption key) encrypts all user data (not a key
  derived directly from the password).
- The DEK is **wrapped** (AES-GCM encrypted) under a password-derived KEK and
  a recovery-phrase-derived KEK. Both wrapped forms are stored on the server.
- At login, the client derives the password KEK and **unwraps** the DEK.
- At recovery, the client derives the recovery KEK, unwraps the DEK from the
  recovery-wrapped form, **re-wraps** it under the new password, and sends the
  new wrapped form to the server.
- Password change also re-wraps the DEK under the new password.
- New endpoints: `GET /api/auth/recovery-info` (returns the recovery-wrapped
  DEK), updated `POST /api/auth/recover-password` (accepts new wrapped DEK).
- New frontend: `RecoveryPage` (email → recovery phrase → new password flow),
  recovery phrase field on `RegisterPage`.

The server never holds the DEK or any KEK — only the wrapped forms.

## Relationship to the original design doc

`docs/product/encryption.md` describes a fuller zero-knowledge architecture
(per-user keys, deterministic encryption for search, key rotation). This Phase 1
implements the core property (server can't read data) with the simplest viable
design. The fuller features remain future work.