.gitignore

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 .env.local
 .env.*.local
 .forgejo-token
+.zcode/
 node_modules/
 dist/
 target/

backend/src/handlers/auth.rs

@@ -27,6 +27,11 @@ pub struct RegisterRequest {
     /// Wrapped DEK (base64 ciphertext) — encrypted under the recovery KEK
     pub recovery_wrapped_dek: Option<String>,
     pub recovery_wrapped_dek_iv: Option<String>,
+    /// Account X25519 identity public key (base64 raw). Plaintext.
+    pub identity_public_key: Option<String>,
+    /// Account X25519 identity private key, wrapped under the account DEK.
+    pub identity_private_key_wrapped: Option<String>,
+    pub identity_private_key_wrapped_iv: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
@@ -40,6 +45,12 @@ pub struct AuthResponse {
     /// user has no wrapped DEK (legacy/pre-recovery accounts).
     pub wrapped_dek: Option<String>,
     pub wrapped_dek_iv: Option<String>,
+    /// Account X25519 identity keypair. The public key is plaintext; the
+    /// private key is an opaque ciphertext blob wrapped under the account DEK.
+    /// Absent for accounts that predate the identity-keypair feature.
+    pub identity_public_key: Option<String>,
+    pub identity_private_key_wrapped: Option<String>,
+    pub identity_private_key_wrapped_iv: Option<String>,
 }
 
 pub async fn register(
@@ -108,6 +119,11 @@ pub async fn register(
     user.recovery_wrapped_dek = req.recovery_wrapped_dek.clone();
     user.recovery_wrapped_dek_iv = req.recovery_wrapped_dek_iv.clone();
     user.recovery_enabled = req.recovery_wrapped_dek.is_some();
+    // Store the X25519 identity keypair (public plaintext, private wrapped
+    // under the account DEK — server stores verbatim, cannot decrypt).
+    user.identity_public_key = req.identity_public_key;
+    user.identity_private_key_wrapped = req.identity_private_key_wrapped;
+    user.identity_private_key_wrapped_iv = req.identity_private_key_wrapped_iv;
 
     // Get token_version before saving
     let token_version = user.token_version;
@@ -203,6 +219,9 @@ pub async fn register(
         username: user.username.clone(),
         wrapped_dek: user.wrapped_dek.clone(),
         wrapped_dek_iv: user.wrapped_dek_iv.clone(),
+        identity_public_key: user.identity_public_key.clone(),
+        identity_private_key_wrapped: user.identity_private_key_wrapped.clone(),
+        identity_private_key_wrapped_iv: user.identity_private_key_wrapped_iv.clone(),
     };
 
     (StatusCode::CREATED, Json(response)).into_response()
@@ -413,6 +432,9 @@ pub async fn login(
         username: user.username.clone(),
         wrapped_dek: user.wrapped_dek.clone(),
         wrapped_dek_iv: user.wrapped_dek_iv.clone(),
+        identity_public_key: user.identity_public_key.clone(),
+        identity_private_key_wrapped: user.identity_private_key_wrapped.clone(),
+        identity_private_key_wrapped_iv: user.identity_private_key_wrapped_iv.clone(),
     };
 
     (StatusCode::OK, Json(response)).into_response()

backend/src/models/user.rs

@@ -37,6 +37,21 @@ pub struct User {
     #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
     pub recovery_wrapped_dek_iv: Option<String>,
 
+    /// Account X25519 identity public key (base64 raw). Plaintext — public keys
+    /// are not secret. Other accounts wrap profile DEKs to this key (Phase B,
+    /// see docs/adr/multi-person-sharing.md). Generated client-side at
+    /// registration.
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub identity_public_key: Option<String>,
+
+    /// Account X25519 identity private key, wrapped (AES-256-GCM encrypted)
+    /// under the account DEK. The server stores this verbatim and cannot
+    /// decrypt it. The client unwraps it at login after unwrapping the DEK.
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub identity_private_key_wrapped: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub identity_private_key_wrapped_iv: Option<String>,
+
     /// Token version for invalidating all tokens on password change
     pub token_version: i32,
 
@@ -93,6 +108,9 @@ impl User {
             wrapped_dek_iv: None,
             recovery_wrapped_dek: None,
             recovery_wrapped_dek_iv: None,
+            identity_public_key: None,
+            identity_private_key_wrapped: None,
+            identity_private_key_wrapped_iv: None,
             token_version: 0,
             created_at: now,
             last_active: now,

backend/tests/auth_tests.rs

@@ -287,6 +287,80 @@ async fn password_change_invalidates_existing_tokens() {
     common::drop_test_db(&db_name).await;
 }
 
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn identity_keypair_round_trips_through_register_and_login() {
+    // Phase A1 (#3): the X25519 identity keypair fields (public plaintext,
+    // private wrapped under the account DEK) are stored verbatim at register
+    // and echoed back on login. The server never inspects or derives them.
+    let (app, db_name) = require_app!(common::app_for_test().await);
+    let email = unique_email();
+
+    // Opaque blobs — the server treats these as base64 strings, nothing more.
+    let public_key = "base64-x25519-public-key-for-test";
+    let priv_wrapped = "base64-wrapped-priv-ciphertext";
+    let priv_wrapped_iv = "base64-12-byte-iv";
+
+    let (status, body) = common::send_json(
+        &app,
+        "POST",
+        "/api/auth/register",
+        Some(json!({
+            "email": email,
+            "username": "tester",
+            "password": "supersecret",
+            "identity_public_key": public_key,
+            "identity_private_key_wrapped": priv_wrapped,
+            "identity_private_key_wrapped_iv": priv_wrapped_iv,
+        })),
+        None,
+    )
+    .await;
+    assert_eq!(status, 201, "register should return 201, body: {body}");
+    assert_eq!(body["identity_public_key"], public_key);
+    assert_eq!(body["identity_private_key_wrapped"], priv_wrapped);
+    assert_eq!(body["identity_private_key_wrapped_iv"], priv_wrapped_iv);
+
+    // Login must echo the same stored values.
+    let (status, body) = common::send_json(
+        &app,
+        "POST",
+        "/api/auth/login",
+        Some(json!({ "email": email, "password": "supersecret" })),
+        None,
+    )
+    .await;
+    assert_eq!(status, 200, "login should return 200, body: {body}");
+    assert_eq!(body["identity_public_key"], public_key);
+    assert_eq!(body["identity_private_key_wrapped"], priv_wrapped);
+    assert_eq!(body["identity_private_key_wrapped_iv"], priv_wrapped_iv);
+
+    common::drop_test_db(&db_name).await;
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn register_without_identity_keypair_stays_optional() {
+    // Backward compat: existing clients that don't send identity fields must
+    // still register successfully, and the fields are absent from the response.
+    let (app, db_name) = require_app!(common::app_for_test().await);
+    let email = unique_email();
+
+    let (status, body) = common::send_json(
+        &app,
+        "POST",
+        "/api/auth/register",
+        Some(json!({ "email": email, "username": "tester", "password": "supersecret" })),
+        None,
+    )
+    .await;
+    assert_eq!(status, 201, "register should return 201, body: {body}");
+    assert!(
+        body.get("identity_public_key").is_none() || body["identity_public_key"].is_null(),
+        "identity_public_key should be absent when not provided: {body}"
+    );
+
+    common::drop_test_db(&db_name).await;
+}
+
 // ---- helpers ----
 
 fn unique_email() -> String {

web/normogen-web/src/crypto/crypto.e2e.test.ts

@@ -9,8 +9,30 @@ import {
   setEncKey,
   clearEncKey,
   hasEncKey,
+  generateIdentityKeyPair,
+  wrapIdentityPrivateKey,
+  unwrapIdentityPrivateKey,
+  setIdentityPrivate,
+  clearIdentityPrivate,
+  hasIdentityPrivate,
 } from './index';
 
+/** X25519 in Web Crypto is a recent addition (Node 16+, modern browsers). Some
+ * test runtimes (older jsdom/Node) may not implement it; detect once and skip
+ * the identity-keypair tests rather than fail spuriously. */
+async function x25519Supported(): Promise<boolean> {
+  try {
+    await crypto.subtle.generateKey(
+      { name: 'ECDH', namedCurve: 'X25519' },
+      true,
+      ['deriveBits'],
+    );
+    return true;
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
 describe('zero-knowledge crypto lifecycle', () => {
   const password = 'my-secret-password';
   const recoveryPhrase = 'my-recovery-phrase';
@@ -99,3 +121,106 @@ describe('zero-knowledge crypto lifecycle', () => {
     await expect(decryptJson(encrypted, setupB.dek)).rejects.toThrow();
   });
 });
+
+describe('account X25519 identity keypair (Phase A1)', () => {
+  const password = 'my-secret-password';
+
+  it('full lifecycle: generate → wrap → unlock DEK → unwrap → deriveBits', async () => {
+    if (!(await x25519Supported())) {
+      console.log('[crypto] skipped (X25519 unsupported in this runtime)');
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // 1. Register: set up the account DEK and generate the identity keypair.
+    const setup = await setupEncryption(password);
+    const { publicKey, privateKey } = await generateIdentityKeyPair();
+    expect(publicKey).not.toBe('');
+    setIdentityPrivate(privateKey);
+    expect(hasIdentityPrivate()).toBe(true);
+
+    // 2. Wrap the private key under the account DEK and "store" it.
+    const wrapped = await wrapIdentityPrivateKey(privateKey, setup.dek);
+    expect(wrapped.data).not.toBe('');
+
+    // 3. Simulate page reload: both keys are lost from memory.
+    clearIdentityPrivate();
+    expect(hasIdentityPrivate()).toBe(false);
+
+    // 4. Unlock the DEK with the password (unlock screen flow).
+    const { dek } = await unlockWithPassword(password, setup.passwordWrappedDek);
+
+    // 5. Unwrap the identity private key from the stored wrapped form.
+    const recovered = await unwrapIdentityPrivateKey(wrapped, dek);
+    setIdentityPrivate(recovered);
+    expect(hasIdentityPrivate()).toBe(true);
+
+    // 6. The recovered private key is a USABLE X25519 key: it can derive a
+    // shared secret against the original public key. Import the public key
+    // and ECDH-derive — this proves the round-trip preserved a working key.
+    const pubBytes = Uint8Array.from(atob(publicKey), (c) => c.charCodeAt(0));
+    const pubKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
+      'raw',
+      pubBytes as BufferSource,
+      { name: 'ECDH', namedCurve: 'X25519' },
+      false,
+      [],
+    );
+    const sharedSecret = await crypto.subtle.deriveBits(
+      { name: 'ECDH', public: pubKey },
+      recovered,
+      256,
+    );
+    expect(sharedSecret.byteLength).toBe(32);
+
+    clearIdentityPrivate();
+  });
+
+  it('a wrapped private key cannot be unwrapped with the wrong DEK', async () => {
+    if (!(await x25519Supported())) {
+      console.log('[crypto] skipped (X25519 unsupported in this runtime)');
+      return;
+    }
+    // DEK for account A; a different DEK for account B.
+    const setupA = await setupEncryption('user-a-password');
+    const setupB = await setupEncryption('user-b-password');
+    const { privateKey } = await generateIdentityKeyPair();
+    const wrapped = await wrapIdentityPrivateKey(privateKey, setupA.dek);
+
+    // User B's DEK cannot unwrap user A's identity private key.
+    await expect(unwrapIdentityPrivateKey(wrapped, setupB.dek)).rejects.toThrow();
+  });
+
+  it('two identity keypairs derive different shared secrets with the same peer', async () => {
+    if (!(await x25519Supported())) {
+      console.log('[crypto] skipped (X25519 unsupported in this runtime)');
+      return;
+    }
+    // Sanity: distinct keypairs must produce distinct ECDH outputs.
+    const peer = await generateIdentityKeyPair();
+    const peerPubBytes = Uint8Array.from(atob(peer.publicKey), (c) => c.charCodeAt(0));
+    const peerPub = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
+      'raw',
+      peerPubBytes as BufferSource,
+      { name: 'ECDH', namedCurve: 'X25519' },
+      false,
+      [],
+    );
+
+    const a = await generateIdentityKeyPair();
+    const b = await generateIdentityKeyPair();
+    const secretA = await crypto.subtle.deriveBits(
+      { name: 'ECDH', public: peerPub },
+      a.privateKey,
+      256,
+    );
+    const secretB = await crypto.subtle.deriveBits(
+      { name: 'ECDH', public: peerPub },
+      b.privateKey,
+      256,
+    );
+
+    const aHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(secretA)).map((x) => x.toString(16)).join('');
+    const bHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(secretB)).map((x) => x.toString(16)).join('');
+    expect(aHex).not.toBe(bHex);
+  });
+});

web/normogen-web/src/crypto/index.ts

@@ -8,10 +8,17 @@ export {
   setupEncryption,
   unlockWithPassword,
   unlockWithRecovery,
+  generateIdentityKeyPair,
+  wrapIdentityPrivateKey,
+  unwrapIdentityPrivateKey,
   setEncKey,
   getEncKey,
   clearEncKey,
   hasEncKey,
+  setIdentityPrivate,
+  getIdentityPrivate,
+  clearIdentityPrivate,
+  hasIdentityPrivate,
   AUTH_SALT,
   PASSWORD_KEK_SALT,
   RECOVERY_KEK_SALT,

web/normogen-web/src/crypto/keys.ts

@@ -185,6 +185,62 @@ export async function unlockWithRecovery(
   return unwrapDek(recoveryWrappedDek, recoveryKek);
 }
 
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Account X25519 identity keypair (Phase A1, multi-person sharing prep).
+//
+// Each account gets an X25519 keypair at registration. The PUBLIC half is
+// stored in plaintext (public keys are not secret); other accounts will wrap
+// profile DEKs to it in Phase B. The PRIVATE half is wrapped (AES-GCM
+// encrypted) under the account DEK and stored on the server as opaque
+// ciphertext. The server never sees the private key.
+//
+// See docs/adr/multi-person-sharing.md §1.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/** Generate an X25519 keypair for the account. Returns the public key as a
+ * base64 raw string (for the server to store) and the private key as a
+ * CryptoKey (kept in memory, wrapped before upload). */
+export async function generateIdentityKeyPair(): Promise<{
+  publicKey: string;
+  privateKey: CryptoKey;
+}> {
+  const { publicKey, privateKey } = (await crypto.subtle.generateKey(
+    { name: 'ECDH', namedCurve: 'X25519' },
+    true, // extractable so we can export the private key for wrapping
+    ['deriveBits'],
+  )) as CryptoKeyPair;
+  const rawPublic = await crypto.subtle.exportKey('raw', publicKey);
+  return { publicKey: base64(new Uint8Array(rawPublic)), privateKey };
+}
+
+/** Wrap (encrypt) the X25519 private key under the account DEK. The DEK is an
+ * AES-GCM key, so we reuse the string-cipher from cipher.ts: export the private
+ * key to raw bytes, base64-encode, and encrypt. */
+export async function wrapIdentityPrivateKey(
+  privateKey: CryptoKey,
+  dek: CryptoKey,
+): Promise<CipherPayload> {
+  const rawPrivate = await crypto.subtle.exportKey('raw', privateKey);
+  return encrypt(base64(new Uint8Array(rawPrivate)), dek);
+}
+
+/** Unwrap (decrypt) the X25519 private key from its DEK-wrapped form. Inverse
+ * of wrapIdentityPrivateKey. The result is importable for ECDH deriveBits. */
+export async function unwrapIdentityPrivateKey(
+  payload: CipherPayload,
+  dek: CryptoKey,
+): Promise<CryptoKey> {
+  const rawPrivateB64 = await decrypt(payload, dek);
+  const rawPrivate = Uint8Array.from(atob(rawPrivateB64), (c) => c.charCodeAt(0));
+  return crypto.subtle.importKey(
+    'raw',
+    rawPrivate as BufferSource,
+    { name: 'ECDH', namedCurve: 'X25519' },
+    true, // extractable so it can be re-wrapped if ever needed
+    ['deriveBits'],
+  );
+}
+
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // In-memory key store (unchanged from Phase 1)
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -207,6 +263,30 @@ export function hasEncKey(): boolean {
   return currentEncKey !== null;
 }
 
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// In-memory identity-private-key store (Phase A1). Same lifecycle as the DEK:
+// held only for the authenticated session, cleared on logout, re-derived from
+// the wrapped form (under the account DEK) on unlock. Not consumed until Phase B.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+let currentIdentityPrivate: CryptoKey | null = null;
+
+export function setIdentityPrivate(key: CryptoKey): void {
+  currentIdentityPrivate = key;
+}
+
+export function getIdentityPrivate(): CryptoKey | null {
+  return currentIdentityPrivate;
+}
+
+export function clearIdentityPrivate(): void {
+  currentIdentityPrivate = null;
+}
+
+export function hasIdentityPrivate(): boolean {
+  return currentIdentityPrivate !== null;
+}
+
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Backward compat: the old deriveAuthAndEncKeys (Phase 1 direct-from-password
 // enc key). Kept for tests; new code uses setupEncryption/unlockWithPassword.

web/normogen-web/src/pages/UnlockPage.tsx

@@ -12,11 +12,23 @@ import {
 } from '@mui/material';
 import { Lock as LockIcon } from '@mui/icons-material';
 import { useAuthStore } from '../store/useStore';
-import { unlockWithPassword, deriveAuthAndEncKeys, setEncKey } from '../crypto';
+import {
+  unlockWithPassword,
+  deriveAuthAndEncKeys,
+  unwrapIdentityPrivateKey,
+  setEncKey,
+  setIdentityPrivate,
+} from '../crypto';
 
 export const UnlockPage: FC = () => {
   const navigate = useNavigate();
-  const { wrapped_dek, wrapped_dek_iv, user } = useAuthStore();
+  const {
+    wrapped_dek,
+    wrapped_dek_iv,
+    identity_private_key_wrapped,
+    identity_private_key_wrapped_iv,
+    user,
+  } = useAuthStore();
   const [password, setPassword] = useState('');
   const [error, setError] = useState('');
   const [unlocking, setUnlocking] = useState(false);
@@ -27,13 +39,32 @@ export const UnlockPage: FC = () => {
     setUnlocking(true);
 
     try {
+      let dek;
       if (wrapped_dek && wrapped_dek_iv) {
         // Wrapped-DEK model: unwrap the DEK using the password.
-        const { dek } = await unlockWithPassword(password, {
+        ({ dek } = await unlockWithPassword(password, {
           data: wrapped_dek,
           iv: wrapped_dek_iv,
-        });
+        }));
         setEncKey(dek);
+        // Phase A1: with the DEK available, also unwrap the X25519 identity
+        // private key into in-memory storage. Non-fatal if it fails (e.g.
+        // legacy accounts without an identity keypair).
+        if (identity_private_key_wrapped && identity_private_key_wrapped_iv) {
+          try {
+            const identityPrivate = await unwrapIdentityPrivateKey(
+              {
+                data: identity_private_key_wrapped,
+                iv: identity_private_key_wrapped_iv,
+              },
+              dek,
+            );
+            setIdentityPrivate(identityPrivate);
+          } catch {
+            // Wrapped private key present but undecryptable — ignore; Phase B
+            // features will surface a re-setup need.
+          }
+        }
       } else {
         // Phase 1 compat: derive the key directly from the password.
         const { encKey } = await deriveAuthAndEncKeys(password);

web/normogen-web/src/store/useStore.ts

@@ -6,8 +6,13 @@ import {
   unlockWithPassword,
   unlockWithRecovery,
   rewrapDek,
+  generateIdentityKeyPair,
+  wrapIdentityPrivateKey,
+  unwrapIdentityPrivateKey,
   setEncKey,
   clearEncKey,
+  clearIdentityPrivate,
+  setIdentityPrivate,
   getEncKey,
   encryptJson,
   decryptJson,
@@ -38,6 +43,12 @@ interface AuthState {
   // on page reload without a full re-login.
   wrapped_dek: string | null;
   wrapped_dek_iv: string | null;
+  // Account X25519 identity keypair (Phase A1). The public key is plaintext;
+  // the private key is the DEK-wrapped ciphertext blob. Persisted for the same
+  // reason as the wrapped DEK — the unlock screen unwraps it into memory.
+  identity_public_key: string | null;
+  identity_private_key_wrapped: string | null;
+  identity_private_key_wrapped_iv: string | null;
 
   // Actions
   login: (email: string, password: string) => Promise<void>;
@@ -128,6 +139,9 @@ export const useAuthStore = create<AuthState>()(
         error: null,
         wrapped_dek: null,
         wrapped_dek_iv: null,
+        identity_public_key: null,
+        identity_private_key_wrapped: null,
+        identity_private_key_wrapped_iv: null,
 
         login: async (email: string, password: string) => {
           set({ isLoading: true, error: null });
@@ -144,6 +158,26 @@ export const useAuthStore = create<AuthState>()(
                   iv: response.wrapped_dek_iv,
                 });
                 setEncKey(dek);
+                // Once the DEK is available, also unwrap the X25519 identity
+                // private key (Phase A1) into in-memory storage.
+                if (
+                  response.identity_private_key_wrapped &&
+                  response.identity_private_key_wrapped_iv
+                ) {
+                  try {
+                    const identityPrivate = await unwrapIdentityPrivateKey(
+                      {
+                        data: response.identity_private_key_wrapped,
+                        iv: response.identity_private_key_wrapped_iv,
+                      },
+                      dek,
+                    );
+                    setIdentityPrivate(identityPrivate);
+                  } catch {
+                    // Wrapped private key present but failed to unwrap —
+                    // non-fatal; Phase B features will surface a re-setup need.
+                  }
+                }
               } catch {
                 // Fallback to the PBKDF2-derived key (Phase 1 compat).
               }
@@ -160,6 +194,9 @@ export const useAuthStore = create<AuthState>()(
               isLoading: false,
               wrapped_dek: response.wrapped_dek ?? null,
               wrapped_dek_iv: response.wrapped_dek_iv ?? null,
+              identity_public_key: response.identity_public_key ?? null,
+              identity_private_key_wrapped: response.identity_private_key_wrapped ?? null,
+              identity_private_key_wrapped_iv: response.identity_private_key_wrapped_iv ?? null,
             });
           } catch (error: any) {
             clearEncKey();
@@ -181,6 +218,13 @@ export const useAuthStore = create<AuthState>()(
             const setup = await setupEncryption(password, recoveryPhrase);
             setEncKey(setup.dek);
 
+            // Phase A1: generate the account X25519 identity keypair and wrap
+            // the private half under the account DEK. The public key is sent
+            // plaintext; the wrapped private key is opaque ciphertext.
+            const { publicKey, privateKey } = await generateIdentityKeyPair();
+            const wrappedPrivate = await wrapIdentityPrivateKey(privateKey, setup.dek);
+            setIdentityPrivate(privateKey);
+
             const response = await apiService.register({
               username,
               email,
@@ -190,7 +234,10 @@ export const useAuthStore = create<AuthState>()(
               recovery_wrapped_dek: setup.recoveryWrappedDek?.data,
               recovery_wrapped_dek_iv: setup.recoveryWrappedDek?.iv,
               recovery_phrase: setup.recoveryKekHash,
-            } as any);
+              identity_public_key: publicKey,
+              identity_private_key_wrapped: wrappedPrivate.data,
+              identity_private_key_wrapped_iv: wrappedPrivate.iv,
+            });
             set({
               user: {
                 user_id: response.user_id,
@@ -203,6 +250,9 @@ export const useAuthStore = create<AuthState>()(
               isLoading: false,
               wrapped_dek: setup.passwordWrappedDek.data,
               wrapped_dek_iv: setup.passwordWrappedDek.iv,
+              identity_public_key: publicKey,
+              identity_private_key_wrapped: wrappedPrivate.data,
+              identity_private_key_wrapped_iv: wrappedPrivate.iv,
             });
           } catch (error: any) {
             set({
@@ -254,6 +304,7 @@ export const useAuthStore = create<AuthState>()(
 
         logout: async () => {
           clearEncKey();
+          clearIdentityPrivate();
           await apiService.logout();
           set({
             user: null,
@@ -262,6 +313,9 @@ export const useAuthStore = create<AuthState>()(
             error: null,
             wrapped_dek: null,
             wrapped_dek_iv: null,
+            identity_public_key: null,
+            identity_private_key_wrapped: null,
+            identity_private_key_wrapped_iv: null,
           });
         },
 
@@ -296,6 +350,9 @@ export const useAuthStore = create<AuthState>()(
           isAuthenticated: state.isAuthenticated,
           wrapped_dek: state.wrapped_dek,
           wrapped_dek_iv: state.wrapped_dek_iv,
+          identity_public_key: state.identity_public_key,
+          identity_private_key_wrapped: state.identity_private_key_wrapped,
+          identity_private_key_wrapped_iv: state.identity_private_key_wrapped_iv,
         }),
       }
     )

web/normogen-web/src/types/api.ts

@@ -42,6 +42,11 @@ export interface AuthTokens {
   email?: string;
   wrapped_dek?: string;
   wrapped_dek_iv?: string;
+  /** Account X25519 identity keypair (Phase A1). Public key is plaintext;
+   * private key is wrapped under the account DEK. Absent for legacy accounts. */
+  identity_public_key?: string;
+  identity_private_key_wrapped?: string;
+  identity_private_key_wrapped_iv?: string;
 }
 
 export interface LoginRequest {
@@ -54,6 +59,18 @@ export interface RegisterRequest {
   email: string;
   password: string;
   role?: 'patient' | 'provider' | 'admin';
+  /** Zero-knowledge wrapped DEK (password KEK). */
+  wrapped_dek?: string;
+  wrapped_dek_iv?: string;
+  /** Zero-knowledge wrapped DEK (recovery KEK). */
+  recovery_wrapped_dek?: string;
+  recovery_wrapped_dek_iv?: string;
+  /** Recovery proof (PBKDF2 derivation of the recovery phrase). */
+  recovery_phrase?: string;
+  /** Account X25519 identity keypair (Phase A1). */
+  identity_public_key?: string;
+  identity_private_key_wrapped?: string;
+  identity_private_key_wrapped_iv?: string;
 }
 
 // Medication Types