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Author SHA1 Message Date
goose
bf5aeedbc2 feat: hard revoke / re-key (Phase C, #3)
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An owner can now rotate a profile's DEK — generating a fresh key,
re-encrypting all the profile's data under it (client-side), and
re-wrapping to the owner share + kept recipients. A revoked recipient's
cached old DEK stops working, closing the soft-revoke window the ADR
requires for graduation / suspected compromise.

The server stays a blind store: it sees opaque old→new ciphertext blobs
flow through, never the DEK or plaintext. No backend crypto.

Backend:
- ProfileRepository::update_wrapped_dek — rotate the owner share
  (account-wrapped profile DEK), owner-scoped.
- ProfileShareRepository::find_active_for_profile +
  delete_for_profile_excluding — list current recipients and hard-delete
  omitted ones.
- POST /api/profiles/:id/rekey: validates each submitted envelope
  against existing active shares (no smuggling new recipients in via
  rekey), rotates the owner share, upserts recipient envelopes with
  fresh ephemeral ECDH keys, hard-deletes omitted recipients.
- rekey_tests.rs: rotation, hard-revoke-from-recipient-view, no-share
  rejection, non-owner rejection, revoke-all.

Frontend:
- useProfileStore.rekeyProfile: fetches all profile data, re-encrypts
  each row under a new DEK (resume-safe — rows already on the new DEK
  are skipped), builds fresh ECDH envelopes per kept recipient, commits
  via POST /rekey, swaps the in-memory DEK.
- ProfileSharing: 'Rotate encryption key (hard revoke)' action with a
  strong confirmation dialog explaining the cost and the resume-safe
  retry.

Best-effort + resumable retry (per design decision); no server-side
write lock.

Verification: backend cargo build/clippy (-D warnings)/fmt clean, tests
compile (integration tests run in CI — Mongo is fixed there). Frontend
tsc clean, 31/31 tests pass.

⚠️ Backend integration tests not run locally (no Mongo in this sandbox);
CI will run them — I'll fix any failures.

Admin-initiated rekey (ADR §5c reserves the permission) is out of scope
— handler is owner-only until admin shares are creatable in Phase D.
Refs #3.
2026-07-19 15:15:39 -03:00
goose
04520539aa feat: profile sharing via X25519 envelope (Phase B, #3)
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An owner can now share a profile with another account; the recipient
reads the profile's metadata AND its data (medications, appointments,
health stats) under their own login. The server stays a blind store:
sharing uses an X25519 envelope — the owner wraps the profile DEK to
the recipient's identity public key via ECDH (fresh ephemeral key per
share), the recipient unwraps it with their identity private key.

Backend:
- models/profile_share.rs: ProfileShare + ProfileShareRepository
  (find_for_recipient, find_for_profile, find_active [checks active +
  expiry], delete, upsert). Indexed on (profileId, recipientUserId) and
  recipientUserId.
- handlers/profile_share.rs: POST/GET /profiles/:id/shares,
  DELETE /profiles/:id/shares/:recipient, GET /profiles/shared-with-me,
  GET /users/public-key (public), and authorize_profile_read — the
  share-gate that admits owner OR active-share recipient.
- The share-gate is wired into list/get for medications, appointments,
  and health stats: when profile_id is specified, resolve the owner via
  the gate and query as them. Data repos stay ownership-scoped.
- Removed the legacy Share system (ADR Open Q5): models/{share,
  permission}.rs, handlers/{shares,permissions}.rs, middleware/
  permission.rs (dead), the shares collection field + methods in
  mongodb_impl.rs, the shares index, and the 5 /api/shares +
  /api/permissions routes.
- share_tests.rs: full owner→recipient→revoke flow, ownership
  isolation, share-to-self/nonexistent/keyless rejections, expired
  share treated as absent.

Frontend:
- crypto/keys.ts: wrapProfileDekToRecipient /
  unwrapProfileDekFromShare (ECDH envelope, ephemeral key per share).
- useProfileStore: loadSharedWithMe (unwrap each share's DEK with the
  identity private key), shareProfile, revokeShare, loadProfileShares.
  Shared profiles merge into the list with is_shared=true.
- ProfileSwitcher: shows shared profiles with a 'shared' chip.
- ProfileSharing (new) + ProfileEditor: owner UI to add a recipient by
  email and revoke; shared profiles render read-only with owner info.
- ECDH round-trip test (owner wraps, recipient unwraps, stranger can't).

Verification: backend cargo build/clippy (-D warnings)/fmt clean, tests
compile (integration tests run in CI — Mongo is fixed there). Frontend
tsc clean, 31/31 tests pass.

⚠️ Backend integration tests not run locally (no Mongo/Docker in this
sandbox); CI will run them — I'll fix any failures immediately.

Phases C (hard revoke / re-key) and D (graduation) remain. Refs #3.
2026-07-19 07:21:11 -03:00