feat(auth): add per-account X25519 identity keypair (#3)
Phase A1 of the multi-person sharing ADR
(docs/adr/multi-person-sharing.md). Each account now gets an X25519
keypair at registration: the public half stored plaintext, the private
half wrapped under the account DEK and stored as opaque ciphertext. The
keypair is generated client-side; the backend adds no crypto deps and
stores everything verbatim, preserving the zero-knowledge contract.
This change only introduces the keypair and threads it through the auth
flows — it is not consumed yet. It unblocks Phase B (profile sharing)
without touching the data model or the ~11 frontend encrypt call sites,
which is Phase A2 (per-profile DEKs).
Backend:
- User model: identity_public_key, identity_private_key_wrapped{,_iv}
(all Option<String>, backward compatible).
- RegisterRequest/AuthResponse carry the 3 fields; register + login
echo them. No changes to change_password/recover (DEK value is
unchanged across both, so the wrapped private key is too).
- 2 new integration tests: round-trip through register/login, and
optional-fields backward compat.
Frontend:
- crypto/keys.ts: generateIdentityKeyPair, wrapIdentityPrivateKey,
unwrapIdentityPrivateKey + in-memory identity store mirroring the DEK.
- types/api.ts: AuthTokens + RegisterRequest extended (removes an
existing `as any` cast).
- useStore register/login/logout + UnlockPage unwrap the private key
alongside the DEK.
- 3 new crypto tests (X25519 lifecycle, wrong-DEK rejection, distinct
shared secrets); skip gracefully where the runtime lacks X25519.
Backend: cargo test + clippy green. Frontend: npm test + tsc green.
Also gitignore .zcode/ (local tooling artifact).
This commit is contained in:
parent
6a569da3b1
commit
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10 changed files with 437 additions and 5 deletions
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@ -9,8 +9,30 @@ import {
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setEncKey,
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clearEncKey,
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hasEncKey,
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generateIdentityKeyPair,
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wrapIdentityPrivateKey,
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unwrapIdentityPrivateKey,
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setIdentityPrivate,
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clearIdentityPrivate,
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hasIdentityPrivate,
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} from './index';
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/** X25519 in Web Crypto is a recent addition (Node 16+, modern browsers). Some
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* test runtimes (older jsdom/Node) may not implement it; detect once and skip
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* the identity-keypair tests rather than fail spuriously. */
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async function x25519Supported(): Promise<boolean> {
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try {
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await crypto.subtle.generateKey(
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{ name: 'ECDH', namedCurve: 'X25519' },
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true,
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['deriveBits'],
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);
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return true;
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} catch {
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return false;
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}
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}
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describe('zero-knowledge crypto lifecycle', () => {
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const password = 'my-secret-password';
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const recoveryPhrase = 'my-recovery-phrase';
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@ -99,3 +121,106 @@ describe('zero-knowledge crypto lifecycle', () => {
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await expect(decryptJson(encrypted, setupB.dek)).rejects.toThrow();
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});
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});
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describe('account X25519 identity keypair (Phase A1)', () => {
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const password = 'my-secret-password';
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it('full lifecycle: generate → wrap → unlock DEK → unwrap → deriveBits', async () => {
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if (!(await x25519Supported())) {
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console.log('[crypto] skipped (X25519 unsupported in this runtime)');
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return;
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}
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// 1. Register: set up the account DEK and generate the identity keypair.
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const setup = await setupEncryption(password);
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const { publicKey, privateKey } = await generateIdentityKeyPair();
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expect(publicKey).not.toBe('');
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setIdentityPrivate(privateKey);
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expect(hasIdentityPrivate()).toBe(true);
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// 2. Wrap the private key under the account DEK and "store" it.
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const wrapped = await wrapIdentityPrivateKey(privateKey, setup.dek);
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expect(wrapped.data).not.toBe('');
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// 3. Simulate page reload: both keys are lost from memory.
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clearIdentityPrivate();
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expect(hasIdentityPrivate()).toBe(false);
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// 4. Unlock the DEK with the password (unlock screen flow).
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const { dek } = await unlockWithPassword(password, setup.passwordWrappedDek);
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// 5. Unwrap the identity private key from the stored wrapped form.
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const recovered = await unwrapIdentityPrivateKey(wrapped, dek);
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setIdentityPrivate(recovered);
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expect(hasIdentityPrivate()).toBe(true);
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// 6. The recovered private key is a USABLE X25519 key: it can derive a
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// shared secret against the original public key. Import the public key
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// and ECDH-derive — this proves the round-trip preserved a working key.
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const pubBytes = Uint8Array.from(atob(publicKey), (c) => c.charCodeAt(0));
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const pubKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
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'raw',
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pubBytes as BufferSource,
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{ name: 'ECDH', namedCurve: 'X25519' },
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false,
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[],
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);
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const sharedSecret = await crypto.subtle.deriveBits(
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{ name: 'ECDH', public: pubKey },
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recovered,
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256,
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);
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expect(sharedSecret.byteLength).toBe(32);
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clearIdentityPrivate();
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});
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it('a wrapped private key cannot be unwrapped with the wrong DEK', async () => {
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if (!(await x25519Supported())) {
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console.log('[crypto] skipped (X25519 unsupported in this runtime)');
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return;
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}
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// DEK for account A; a different DEK for account B.
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const setupA = await setupEncryption('user-a-password');
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const setupB = await setupEncryption('user-b-password');
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const { privateKey } = await generateIdentityKeyPair();
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const wrapped = await wrapIdentityPrivateKey(privateKey, setupA.dek);
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// User B's DEK cannot unwrap user A's identity private key.
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await expect(unwrapIdentityPrivateKey(wrapped, setupB.dek)).rejects.toThrow();
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});
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it('two identity keypairs derive different shared secrets with the same peer', async () => {
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if (!(await x25519Supported())) {
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console.log('[crypto] skipped (X25519 unsupported in this runtime)');
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return;
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}
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// Sanity: distinct keypairs must produce distinct ECDH outputs.
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const peer = await generateIdentityKeyPair();
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const peerPubBytes = Uint8Array.from(atob(peer.publicKey), (c) => c.charCodeAt(0));
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const peerPub = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
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'raw',
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peerPubBytes as BufferSource,
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{ name: 'ECDH', namedCurve: 'X25519' },
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false,
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[],
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);
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const a = await generateIdentityKeyPair();
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const b = await generateIdentityKeyPair();
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const secretA = await crypto.subtle.deriveBits(
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{ name: 'ECDH', public: peerPub },
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a.privateKey,
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256,
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);
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const secretB = await crypto.subtle.deriveBits(
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{ name: 'ECDH', public: peerPub },
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b.privateKey,
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256,
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);
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const aHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(secretA)).map((x) => x.toString(16)).join('');
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const bHex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(secretB)).map((x) => x.toString(16)).join('');
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expect(aHex).not.toBe(bHex);
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});
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});
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