fix(backend): P0 security hardening pass

Address the four P0 security items from the project review:

* token_version validation (#1): the JWT middleware now rejects access tokens
  whose token_version claim is stale (e.g. issued before a password change).
  A short-TTL (30s) in-memory cache (TokenVersionCache) avoids a Mongo lookup
  per request; credential changes invalidate the cache immediately on the
  handling instance.

* Fail-fast config (#2): add APP_ENVIRONMENT (development|production). In
  production the server refuses to boot unless JWT_SECRET and ENCRYPTION_KEY
  are set to non-default values; development keeps the insecure defaults with
  a warning.

* Real client IP in audit logs (#4): new client_ip middleware resolves the
  originating IP (X-Forwarded-For > X-Real-IP > ConnectInfo socket) and
  exposes it via a ClientIp extractor. All five hardcoded "0.0.0.0" audit
  calls are replaced, and the missing PasswordChanged audit event is added to
  change_password. axum::serve now uses into_make_service_with_connect_info.

* Refresh token persistence (#5): refresh tokens are now stored hashed in
  MongoDB (RefreshTokenRepository) instead of an in-memory map lost on restart.
  Added /api/auth/refresh (with rotation + token_version check) and
  /api/auth/logout routes; register/login return a refresh_token; password
  change/recovery revoke all of a user's refresh tokens. JwtService now honors
  JwtConfig expiries instead of hardcoding 15min/30d, and the dead in-memory
  refresh store is removed.

Also: wire up DatabaseInitializer (was never called), fix the refresh_tokens
index to tokenHash + add an expiresAt TTL index, add sha2 dep.

Rate limiting (#3) is deferred per scope; the stub remains.

Verified: cargo fmt --check clean, cargo build/clippy --all-targets clean,
18 unit tests pass (9 new). Integration tests (tests/*) still need a live
server — fixing them is tracked as P1.

BREAKING CHANGE: AuthResponse now includes a refresh_token field.

backend/.env.example

@@ -1,8 +1,21 @@
 RUST_LOG=info
+
+# Deployment environment.
+#   development (default) — allows insecure JWT_SECRET/ENCRYPTION_KEY defaults (with warnings).
+#   production            — REFUSES to boot unless JWT_SECRET and ENCRYPTION_KEY are set to
+#                           strong, non-default values.
+APP_ENVIRONMENT=development
+
 SERVER_HOST=0.0.0.0
 SERVER_PORT=8000
 MONGODB_URI=mongodb://mongodb:27017
 MONGODB_DATABASE=normogen
-JWT_SECRET=change-this-to-a-random-secret-key
+
+# Generate with: openssl rand -base64 48
+# MUST be changed and MUST NOT equal "secret" when APP_ENVIRONMENT=production.
+JWT_SECRET=change-this-to-a-strong-random-secret-key
 JWT_ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRY_MINUTES=15
 JWT_REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY_DAYS=30
+
+# MUST be set (and not the default) when APP_ENVIRONMENT=production.
+ENCRYPTION_KEY=change-this-to-a-32-byte-key

backend/Cargo.lock

@@ -1327,6 +1327,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "reqwest",
  "serde",
  "serde_json",
+ "sha2",
  "slog",
  "strum",
  "strum_macros",

backend/Cargo.toml

@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ pbkdf2 = { version = "0.12.2", features = ["simple"] }
 password-hash = "0.5.0"
 rand = "0.8.5"
 base64 = "0.22.1"
+sha2 = "0.10"
 thiserror = "1.0.69"
 anyhow = "1.0.94"
 tracing = "0.1.41"

backend/src/auth/jwt.rs

@@ -3,9 +3,6 @@ use anyhow::Result;
 use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
 use jsonwebtoken::{decode, encode, DecodingKey, EncodingKey, Header, Validation};
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
-use std::collections::HashMap;
-use std::sync::Arc;
-use tokio::sync::RwLock;
 
 use crate::config::JwtConfig;
 
@@ -21,9 +18,11 @@ pub struct Claims {
 }
 
 impl Claims {
-    pub fn new(user_id: String, email: String, token_version: i32) -> Self {
+    /// Build access-token claims. `expiry` is the access-token lifetime and is
+    /// taken from `JwtConfig` by callers (no longer hardcoded here).
+    pub fn new(user_id: String, email: String, token_version: i32, expiry: Duration) -> Self {
         let now = Utc::now();
-        let exp = now + Duration::minutes(15); // Access token expires in 15 minutes
+        let exp = now + expiry;
 
         Self {
             sub: user_id.clone(),
@@ -47,9 +46,10 @@ pub struct RefreshClaims {
 }
 
 impl RefreshClaims {
-    pub fn new(user_id: String, token_version: i32) -> Self {
+    /// Build refresh-token claims. `expiry` is taken from `JwtConfig` by callers.
+    pub fn new(user_id: String, token_version: i32, expiry: Duration) -> Self {
         let now = Utc::now();
-        let exp = now + Duration::days(30); // Refresh token expires in 30 days
+        let exp = now + expiry;
 
         Self {
             sub: user_id.clone(),
@@ -61,12 +61,15 @@ impl RefreshClaims {
     }
 }
 
-/// JWT Service for token generation and validation
+/// JWT Service for token generation and validation.
+///
+/// Pure crypto service: it signs/verifies tokens but does NOT track them. Token
+/// persistence (refresh-token storage, revocation) is handled by
+/// `RefreshTokenRepository` + the auth handlers; token-version staleness is
+/// enforced in the JWT middleware via `TokenVersionCache`.
 #[derive(Clone)]
 pub struct JwtService {
     config: JwtConfig,
-    // In-memory storage for refresh tokens (user_id -> set of tokens)
-    refresh_tokens: Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, Vec<String>>>>,
     encoding_key: EncodingKey,
     decoding_key: DecodingKey,
 }
@@ -78,27 +81,38 @@ impl JwtService {
 
         Self {
             config,
-            refresh_tokens: Arc::new(RwLock::new(HashMap::new())),
             encoding_key,
             decoding_key,
         }
     }
 
-    /// Generate access and refresh tokens
+    /// Generate access and refresh tokens. Both expiries are derived from the
+    /// configured `JwtConfig` so callers don't need to thread durations through.
     pub fn generate_tokens(&self, claims: Claims) -> Result<(String, String)> {
-        // Generate access token
         let access_token = encode(&Header::default(), &claims, &self.encoding_key)
             .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("Failed to encode access token: {}", e))?;
 
-        // Generate refresh token
+        let refresh_expiry = Duration::days(self.config.refresh_token_expiry_days);
-        let refresh_claims = RefreshClaims::new(claims.user_id.clone(), claims.token_version);
+        let refresh_claims =
+            RefreshClaims::new(claims.user_id.clone(), claims.token_version, refresh_expiry);
         let refresh_token = encode(&Header::default(), &refresh_claims, &self.encoding_key)
             .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("Failed to encode refresh token: {}", e))?;
 
         Ok((access_token, refresh_token))
     }
 
-    /// Validate access token
+    /// The configured refresh-token lifetime, as a chrono `Duration`.
+    pub fn refresh_expiry(&self) -> Duration {
+        Duration::days(self.config.refresh_token_expiry_days)
+    }
+
+    /// The configured access-token lifetime, as a chrono `Duration`.
+    pub fn access_expiry(&self) -> Duration {
+        Duration::minutes(self.config.access_token_expiry_minutes)
+    }
+
+    /// Validate access token (signature + expiry only). Callers are responsible
+    /// for any `token_version` comparison against the user record.
     pub fn validate_token(&self, token: &str) -> Result<Claims> {
         let token_data = decode::<Claims>(token, &self.decoding_key, &Validation::default())
             .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("Invalid token: {}", e))?;
@@ -106,73 +120,59 @@ impl JwtService {
         Ok(token_data.claims)
     }
 
-    /// Validate refresh token
+    /// Validate refresh token (signature + expiry only). Callers must still
+    /// confirm the token exists, is not revoked, and has not expired in the
+    /// `RefreshTokenRepository`.
     pub fn validate_refresh_token(&self, token: &str) -> Result<RefreshClaims> {
         let token_data = decode::<RefreshClaims>(token, &self.decoding_key, &Validation::default())
             .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("Invalid refresh token: {}", e))?;
 
         Ok(token_data.claims)
     }
+}
 
-    /// Store refresh token for a user
+#[cfg(test)]
-    pub async fn store_refresh_token(&self, user_id: &str, token: &str) -> Result<()> {
+mod tests {
-        let mut tokens = self.refresh_tokens.write().await;
+    use super::*;
-        tokens
-            .entry(user_id.to_string())
-            .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
-            .push(token.to_string());
 
-        // Keep only last 5 tokens per user
+    fn test_config() -> JwtConfig {
-        if let Some(user_tokens) = tokens.get_mut(user_id) {
+        JwtConfig {
-            user_tokens.sort();
+            secret: "test-secret".to_string(),
-            user_tokens.dedup();
+            access_token_expiry_minutes: 15,
-            if user_tokens.len() > 5 {
+            refresh_token_expiry_days: 7,
-                *user_tokens = user_tokens.split_off(user_tokens.len() - 5);
         }
     }
 
-        Ok(())
+    #[test]
+    fn generate_then_validate_roundtrip() {
+        let svc = JwtService::new(test_config());
+        let claims = Claims::new(
+            "user-1".to_string(),
+            "u@example.com".to_string(),
+            0,
+            Duration::minutes(15),
+        );
+        let (access, refresh) = svc.generate_tokens(claims).unwrap();
+
+        let access_claims = svc.validate_token(&access).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(access_claims.user_id, "user-1");
+        assert_eq!(access_claims.token_version, 0);
+
+        let refresh_claims = svc.validate_refresh_token(&refresh).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(refresh_claims.user_id, "user-1");
     }
 
-    /// Verify if a refresh token is stored
+    #[test]
-    pub async fn verify_refresh_token_stored(&self, user_id: &str, token: &str) -> Result<bool> {
+    fn refresh_version_is_carried_through() {
-        let tokens = self.refresh_tokens.read().await;
+        let svc = JwtService::new(test_config());
-        if let Some(user_tokens) = tokens.get(user_id) {
+        let claims = Claims::new(
-            Ok(user_tokens.contains(&token.to_string()))
+            "user-2".to_string(),
-        } else {
+            "u2@example.com".to_string(),
-            Ok(false)
+            3,
-        }
+            Duration::minutes(15),
-    }
+        );
-
+        let (_access, refresh) = svc.generate_tokens(claims).unwrap();
-    /// Rotate refresh token (remove old, add new)
+        let refresh_claims = svc.validate_refresh_token(&refresh).unwrap();
-    pub async fn rotate_refresh_token(
+        assert_eq!(refresh_claims.token_version, 3);
-        &self,
-        user_id: &str,
-        old_token: &str,
-        new_token: &str,
-    ) -> Result<()> {
-        // Remove old token
-        self.revoke_refresh_token(old_token).await?;
-
-        // Add new token
-        self.store_refresh_token(user_id, new_token).await?;
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Revoke a specific refresh token
-    pub async fn revoke_refresh_token(&self, token: &str) -> Result<()> {
-        let mut tokens = self.refresh_tokens.write().await;
-        for user_tokens in tokens.values_mut() {
-            user_tokens.retain(|t| t != token);
-        }
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Revoke all refresh tokens for a user
-    pub async fn revoke_all_user_tokens(&self, user_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
-        let mut tokens = self.refresh_tokens.write().await;
-        tokens.remove(user_id);
-        Ok(())
     }
 }

backend/src/auth/mod.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 #![allow(dead_code)]
 pub mod jwt;
 pub mod password;
+pub mod token_version_cache;
 
 pub use jwt::JwtService;
+pub use token_version_cache::TokenVersionCache;

backend/src/auth/token_version_cache.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
+
+use anyhow::Result;
+use mongodb::bson::oid::ObjectId;
+use tokio::sync::RwLock;
+
+use crate::db::MongoDb;
+
+/// How long a cached token_version is considered fresh before re-querying Mongo.
+const DEFAULT_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
+
+/// Short-TTL in-memory cache of `{ user_id -> token_version }`.
+///
+/// This lets the JWT auth middleware reject access tokens whose `token_version`
+/// claim is stale (e.g. issued before a password change) without doing a Mongo
+/// lookup on every request. Stale entries are evicted on credential changes via
+/// [`TokenVersionCache::invalidate`], so a version bump becomes visible within
+/// at most `ttl` on other instances, and immediately on the instance that
+/// processed the change.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct TokenVersionCache {
+    map: Arc<RwLock<HashMap<ObjectId, (i32, Instant)>>>,
+    ttl: Duration,
+}
+
+impl TokenVersionCache {
+    pub fn new(ttl: Duration) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            map: Arc::new(RwLock::new(HashMap::new())),
+            ttl,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Build a cache with the default 30s TTL.
+    pub fn with_default_ttl() -> Self {
+        Self::new(DEFAULT_TTL)
+    }
+
+    /// Return the user's current `token_version`, loading it from Mongo on a
+    /// cache miss or once the cached value is older than the TTL.
+    ///
+    /// Returns `Ok(None)` when the user no longer exists (deleted), so callers
+    /// can reject the token as unauthorized.
+    pub async fn get_or_load(&self, user_id: &ObjectId, db: &MongoDb) -> Result<Option<i32>> {
+        // Fast path: serve from cache if fresh.
+        {
+            let cache = self.map.read().await;
+            if let Some((version, fetched_at)) = cache.get(user_id) {
+                if fetched_at.elapsed() < self.ttl {
+                    return Ok(Some(*version));
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Slow path: query Mongo and refresh the cache.
+        let version = match db.find_user_by_id(user_id).await? {
+            Some(user) => Some(user.token_version),
+            None => None,
+        };
+
+        let mut cache = self.map.write().await;
+        match version {
+            Some(v) => {
+                cache.insert(*user_id, (v, Instant::now()));
+            }
+            None => {
+                // User was deleted: drop any stale entry so we don't serve it.
+                cache.remove(user_id);
+            }
+        }
+
+        Ok(version)
+    }
+
+    /// Drop the cached entry for a user. Call this whenever a user's
+    /// `token_version` is bumped (password change / recovery) so that the new
+    /// version becomes visible immediately instead of waiting for TTL expiry.
+    pub async fn invalidate(&self, user_id: &ObjectId) {
+        let mut cache = self.map.write().await;
+        cache.remove(user_id);
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn invalidate_removes_entry() {
+        // We can't easily exercise get_or_load without Mongo, but invalidate on
+        // an empty cache is a no-op and must not panic.
+        let cache = TokenVersionCache::with_default_ttl();
+        cache.invalidate(&ObjectId::new()).await;
+        assert!(cache.map.read().await.is_empty());
+    }
+}

backend/src/config/mod.rs

@@ -3,6 +3,34 @@
 use anyhow::Result;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 
+use crate::auth::token_version_cache::TokenVersionCache;
+
+/// Deployment environment. In `Production`, insecure config defaults are rejected
+/// at boot so the service never starts with a known secret/encryption key.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
+pub enum Environment {
+    Development,
+    Production,
+}
+
+impl Environment {
+    /// Parse `APP_ENVIRONMENT` (case-insensitive). Defaults to `Development`.
+    pub fn from_env() -> Self {
+        match std::env::var("APP_ENVIRONMENT")
+            .unwrap_or_default()
+            .to_ascii_lowercase()
+            .as_str()
+        {
+            "prod" | "production" => Environment::Production,
+            _ => Environment::Development,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Insecure sentinel values that must never be used in production.
+const INSECURE_JWT_SECRET: &str = "secret";
+const INSECURE_ENCRYPTION_KEY: &str = "default_key_32_bytes_long!";
+
 #[derive(Clone)]
 pub struct AppState {
     pub db: crate::db::MongoDb,
@@ -16,6 +44,15 @@ pub struct AppState {
 
     /// Phase 2.8: Interaction checker service
     pub interaction_service: Option<Arc<crate::services::InteractionService>>,
+
+    /// P0: short-TTL cache of {user_id -> token_version} so the JWT middleware
+    /// can reject tokens whose version is stale (e.g. after a password change)
+    /// without a Mongo lookup on every request.
+    pub token_version_cache: Arc<TokenVersionCache>,
+
+    /// P0: persisted (hashed) refresh tokens, used for rotation, revocation,
+    /// and surviving process restarts.
+    pub refresh_token_repo: Option<Arc<crate::models::refresh_token::RefreshTokenRepository>>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
@@ -25,6 +62,7 @@ pub struct Config {
     pub jwt: JwtConfig,
     pub encryption: EncryptionConfig,
     pub cors: CorsConfig,
+    pub environment: Environment,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
@@ -68,6 +106,43 @@ pub struct CorsConfig {
 
 impl Config {
     pub fn from_env() -> Result<Self> {
+        let environment = Environment::from_env();
+
+        // JWT_SECRET — required to be a real secret in production.
+        let jwt_secret =
+            std::env::var("JWT_SECRET").unwrap_or_else(|_| INSECURE_JWT_SECRET.to_string());
+        if environment == Environment::Production {
+            if jwt_secret.is_empty() || jwt_secret == INSECURE_JWT_SECRET {
+                anyhow::bail!(
+                    "JWT_SECRET must be set to a strong, unique value in production (APP_ENVIRONMENT=production). \
+                     Refusing to boot with an insecure default."
+                );
+            }
+            tracing::info!("JWT_SECRET validated for production");
+        } else if jwt_secret == INSECURE_JWT_SECRET {
+            tracing::warn!(
+                "JWT_SECRET is using the insecure default \"{}\". This is allowed only in development.",
+                INSECURE_JWT_SECRET
+            );
+        }
+
+        // ENCRYPTION_KEY — required to be a real key in production.
+        let encryption_key =
+            std::env::var("ENCRYPTION_KEY").unwrap_or_else(|_| INSECURE_ENCRYPTION_KEY.to_string());
+        if environment == Environment::Production {
+            if encryption_key.is_empty() || encryption_key == INSECURE_ENCRYPTION_KEY {
+                anyhow::bail!(
+                    "ENCRYPTION_KEY must be set to a strong, unique value in production (APP_ENVIRONMENT=production). \
+                     Refusing to boot with an insecure default."
+                );
+            }
+            tracing::info!("ENCRYPTION_KEY validated for production");
+        } else if encryption_key == INSECURE_ENCRYPTION_KEY {
+            tracing::warn!(
+                "ENCRYPTION_KEY is using the insecure default. This is allowed only in development."
+            );
+        }
+
         Ok(Config {
             server: ServerConfig {
                 host: std::env::var("NORMOGEN_HOST").unwrap_or_else(|_| "0.0.0.0".to_string()),
@@ -82,7 +157,7 @@ impl Config {
                     .unwrap_or_else(|_| "normogen".to_string()),
             },
             jwt: JwtConfig {
-                secret: std::env::var("JWT_SECRET").unwrap_or_else(|_| "secret".to_string()),
+                secret: jwt_secret,
                 access_token_expiry_minutes: std::env::var("JWT_ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRY_MINUTES")
                     .unwrap_or_else(|_| "15".to_string())
                     .parse()?,
@@ -91,8 +166,7 @@ impl Config {
                     .parse()?,
             },
             encryption: EncryptionConfig {
-                key: std::env::var("ENCRYPTION_KEY")
+                key: encryption_key,
-                    .unwrap_or_else(|_| "default_key_32_bytes_long!".to_string()),
             },
             cors: CorsConfig {
                 allowed_origins: std::env::var("CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS")
@@ -101,6 +175,7 @@ impl Config {
                     .map(|s| s.to_string())
                     .collect(),
             },
+            environment,
         })
     }
 }

backend/src/db/init.rs

@@ -1,35 +1,31 @@
 #![allow(dead_code)]
-use mongodb::{bson::doc, Client, Collection, IndexModel};
+use mongodb::{bson::doc, options::IndexOptions, Collection, IndexModel};
 
 use anyhow::Result;
 
+/// Creates required collections and indexes. Best-effort by design: index
+/// creation failures are logged as warnings and do not abort startup, matching
+/// the existing swallow-on-warning style. Safe to run repeatedly (idempotent).
 pub struct DatabaseInitializer {
-    client: Client,
+    db: mongodb::Database,
-    db_name: String,
 }
 
 impl DatabaseInitializer {
-    pub fn new(client: Client, db_name: String) -> Self {
+    pub fn new(db: mongodb::Database) -> Self {
-        Self { client, db_name }
+        Self { db }
     }
 
     pub async fn initialize(&self) -> Result<()> {
-        let db = self.client.database(&self.db_name);
-
         println!("[MongoDB] Initializing database collections and indexes...");
 
         // Create users collection and index
         {
-            let collection: Collection<mongodb::bson::Document> = db.collection("users");
+            let collection: Collection<mongodb::bson::Document> = self.db.collection("users");
 
             // Create email index using the builder pattern
             let index = IndexModel::builder()
                 .keys(doc! { "email": 1 })
-                .options(
+                .options(IndexOptions::builder().unique(true).build())
-                    mongodb::options::IndexOptions::builder()
-                        .unique(true)
-                        .build(),
-                )
                 .build();
 
             match collection.create_index(index, None).await {
@@ -40,7 +36,7 @@ impl DatabaseInitializer {
 
         // Create families collection and indexes
         {
-            let collection: Collection<mongodb::bson::Document> = db.collection("families");
+            let collection: Collection<mongodb::bson::Document> = self.db.collection("families");
 
             let index1 = IndexModel::builder().keys(doc! { "userId": 1 }).build();
 
@@ -62,7 +58,7 @@ impl DatabaseInitializer {
 
         // Create profiles collection and index
         {
-            let collection: Collection<mongodb::bson::Document> = db.collection("profiles");
+            let collection: Collection<mongodb::bson::Document> = self.db.collection("profiles");
 
             let index = IndexModel::builder().keys(doc! { "familyId": 1 }).build();
 
@@ -77,31 +73,35 @@ impl DatabaseInitializer {
 
         // Create health_data collection
         {
-            let _collection: Collection<mongodb::bson::Document> = db.collection("health_data");
+            let _collection: Collection<mongodb::bson::Document> =
+                self.db.collection("health_data");
             println!("✓ Created health_data collection");
         }
 
         // Create lab_results collection
         {
-            let _collection: Collection<mongodb::bson::Document> = db.collection("lab_results");
+            let _collection: Collection<mongodb::bson::Document> =
+                self.db.collection("lab_results");
             println!("✓ Created lab_results collection");
         }
 
         // Create medications collection
         {
-            let _collection: Collection<mongodb::bson::Document> = db.collection("medications");
+            let _collection: Collection<mongodb::bson::Document> =
+                self.db.collection("medications");
             println!("✓ Created medications collection");
         }
 
         // Create appointments collection
         {
-            let _collection: Collection<mongodb::bson::Document> = db.collection("appointments");
+            let _collection: Collection<mongodb::bson::Document> =
+                self.db.collection("appointments");
             println!("✓ Created appointments collection");
         }
 
         // Create shares collection and index
         {
-            let collection: Collection<mongodb::bson::Document> = db.collection("shares");
+            let collection: Collection<mongodb::bson::Document> = self.db.collection("shares");
 
             let index = IndexModel::builder().keys(doc! { "familyId": 1 }).build();
 
@@ -111,23 +111,41 @@ impl DatabaseInitializer {
             }
         }
 
-        // Create refresh_tokens collection and index
+        // Create refresh_tokens collection and indexes.
+        // - unique index on tokenHash (the only thing we ever look tokens up by)
+        // - TTL index on expiresAt so expired tokens are auto-deleted by Mongo
         {
-            let collection: Collection<mongodb::bson::Document> = db.collection("refresh_tokens");
+            let collection: Collection<mongodb::bson::Document> =
+                self.db.collection("refresh_tokens");
 
-            let index = IndexModel::builder()
+            let unique_index = IndexModel::builder()
-                .keys(doc! { "token": 1 })
+                .keys(doc! { "tokenHash": 1 })
+                .options(IndexOptions::builder().unique(true).build())
+                .build();
+
+            // TTL: documents are deleted once their `expiresAt` timestamp passes.
+            // With expireAfterSeconds=0, Mongo removes each doc exactly when the
+            // datetime stored in `expiresAt` is reached.
+            let ttl_index = IndexModel::builder()
+                .keys(doc! { "expiresAt": 1 })
                 .options(
-                    mongodb::options::IndexOptions::builder()
+                    IndexOptions::builder()
-                        .unique(true)
+                        .expire_after(std::time::Duration::from_secs(0))
                         .build(),
                 )
                 .build();
 
-            match collection.create_index(index, None).await {
+            match collection.create_index(unique_index, None).await {
-                Ok(_) => println!("✓ Created index on refresh_tokens.token"),
+                Ok(_) => println!("✓ Created unique index on refresh_tokens.tokenHash"),
                 Err(e) => println!(
-                    "Warning: Failed to create index on refresh_tokens.token: {}",
+                    "Warning: Failed to create index on refresh_tokens.tokenHash: {}",
+                    e
+                ),
+            }
+            match collection.create_index(ttl_index, None).await {
+                Ok(_) => println!("✓ Created TTL index on refresh_tokens.expiresAt"),
+                Err(e) => println!(
+                    "Warning: Failed to create TTL index on refresh_tokens.expiresAt: {}",
                     e
                 ),
             }

backend/src/db/mod.rs

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ pub mod init; // Database initialization module
 
 mod mongodb_impl;
 
+pub use init::DatabaseInitializer;
 pub use mongodb_impl::MongoDb;
 
 pub async fn create_database() -> Result<Database> {

backend/src/handlers/auth.rs

@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
-use axum::{extract::State, http::StatusCode, response::IntoResponse, Json};
+use axum::{extract::Extension, extract::State, http::StatusCode, response::IntoResponse, Json};
+use mongodb::bson::oid::ObjectId;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use validator::Validate;
 
 use crate::{
-    auth::jwt::Claims, config::AppState, models::audit_log::AuditEventType, models::user::User,
+    auth::jwt::Claims, config::AppState, middleware::ClientIp, models::audit_log::AuditEventType,
+    models::user::User,
 };
 
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Validate)]
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@ pub struct RegisterRequest {
 #[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
 pub struct AuthResponse {
     pub token: String,
+    pub refresh_token: String,
     pub user_id: String,
     pub email: String,
     pub username: String,
@@ -28,6 +31,7 @@ pub struct AuthResponse {
 
 pub async fn register(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Extension(client_ip): Extension<ClientIp>,
     Json(req): Json<RegisterRequest>,
 ) -> impl IntoResponse {
     if let Err(errors) = req.validate() {
@@ -98,7 +102,7 @@ pub async fn register(
                         AuditEventType::LoginSuccess, // Using LoginSuccess as registration event
                         Some(id),
                         Some(req.email.clone()),
-                        "0.0.0.0".to_string(),
+                        client_ip.as_str().to_string(),
                         None,
                         None,
                     )
@@ -127,9 +131,14 @@ pub async fn register(
         }
     };
 
-    // Generate JWT token
+    // Generate JWT token pair and persist the refresh token.
-    let claims = Claims::new(user_id.to_string(), user.email.clone(), token_version);
+    let claims = Claims::new(
-    let (token, _refresh_token) = match state.jwt_service.generate_tokens(claims) {
+        user_id.to_string(),
+        user.email.clone(),
+        token_version,
+        state.jwt_service.access_expiry(),
+    );
+    let (token, refresh_token) = match state.jwt_service.generate_tokens(claims) {
         Ok(t) => t,
         Err(e) => {
             tracing::error!("Failed to generate token: {}", e);
@@ -142,9 +151,19 @@ pub async fn register(
                 .into_response();
         }
     };
+    if let Some(ref repo) = state.refresh_token_repo {
+        let expires_at = refresh_expiry_bson(&state.jwt_service);
+        if let Err(e) = repo
+            .create(&user_id.to_string(), &refresh_token, expires_at)
+            .await
+        {
+            tracing::warn!("Failed to persist refresh token on register: {}", e);
+        }
+    }
 
     let response = AuthResponse {
         token,
+        refresh_token,
         user_id: user_id.to_string(),
         email: user.email,
         username: user.username,
@@ -163,6 +182,7 @@ pub struct LoginRequest {
 
 pub async fn login(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Extension(client_ip): Extension<ClientIp>,
     Json(req): Json<LoginRequest>,
 ) -> impl IntoResponse {
     if let Err(errors) = req.validate() {
@@ -212,7 +232,7 @@ pub async fn login(
                         AuditEventType::LoginFailed,
                         None,
                         Some(req.email.clone()),
-                        "0.0.0.0".to_string(), // TODO: Extract real IP
+                        client_ip.as_str().to_string(),
                         None,
                         None,
                     )
@@ -272,7 +292,7 @@ pub async fn login(
                         AuditEventType::LoginFailed,
                         Some(user_id),
                         Some(req.email.clone()),
-                        "0.0.0.0".to_string(), // TODO: Extract real IP
+                        client_ip.as_str().to_string(),
                         None,
                         None,
                     )
@@ -301,9 +321,14 @@ pub async fn login(
 
     // Update last active timestamp (TODO: Implement in database layer)
 
-    // Generate JWT token
+    // Generate JWT token pair and persist the refresh token.
-    let claims = Claims::new(user_id.to_string(), user.email.clone(), user.token_version);
+    let claims = Claims::new(
-    let (token, _refresh_token) = match state.jwt_service.generate_tokens(claims) {
+        user_id.to_string(),
+        user.email.clone(),
+        user.token_version,
+        state.jwt_service.access_expiry(),
+    );
+    let (token, refresh_token) = match state.jwt_service.generate_tokens(claims) {
         Ok(t) => t,
         Err(e) => {
             tracing::error!("Failed to generate token: {}", e);
@@ -316,6 +341,15 @@ pub async fn login(
                 .into_response();
         }
     };
+    if let Some(ref repo) = state.refresh_token_repo {
+        let expires_at = refresh_expiry_bson(&state.jwt_service);
+        if let Err(e) = repo
+            .create(&user_id.to_string(), &refresh_token, expires_at)
+            .await
+        {
+            tracing::warn!("Failed to persist refresh token on login: {}", e);
+        }
+    }
 
     // Log successful login (Phase 2.6)
     if let Some(ref audit) = state.audit_logger {
@@ -324,7 +358,7 @@ pub async fn login(
                 AuditEventType::LoginSuccess,
                 Some(user_id),
                 Some(req.email.clone()),
-                "0.0.0.0".to_string(), // TODO: Extract real IP
+                client_ip.as_str().to_string(),
                 None,
                 None,
             )
@@ -333,6 +367,7 @@ pub async fn login(
 
     let response = AuthResponse {
         token,
+        refresh_token,
         user_id: user_id.to_string(),
         email: user.email,
         username: user.username,
@@ -353,6 +388,7 @@ pub struct RecoverPasswordRequest {
 
 pub async fn recover_password(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Extension(client_ip): Extension<ClientIp>,
     Json(req): Json<RecoverPasswordRequest>,
 ) -> impl IntoResponse {
     if let Err(errors) = req.validate() {
@@ -432,6 +468,20 @@ pub async fn recover_password(
     // Save updated user
     match state.db.update_user(&user).await {
         Ok(_) => {
+            // Password change bumps token_version, so existing access tokens are
+            // rejected; also revoke every refresh token so they can't be used to
+            // mint new access tokens.
+            if let Some(ref repo) = state.refresh_token_repo {
+                if let Some(ref uid) = user.id.as_ref().map(|oid| oid.to_string()) {
+                    if let Err(e) = repo.revoke_all_by_user(uid).await {
+                        tracing::warn!("Failed to revoke refresh tokens on recovery: {}", e);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            if let Some(ref uid) = user.id {
+                state.token_version_cache.invalidate(uid).await;
+            }
+
             // Log password recovery (Phase 2.6)
             if let Some(ref audit) = state.audit_logger {
                 let user_id_for_log = user.id;
@@ -440,7 +490,7 @@ pub async fn recover_password(
                         AuditEventType::PasswordRecovery,
                         user_id_for_log,
                         Some(req.email.clone()),
-                        "0.0.0.0".to_string(),
+                        client_ip.as_str().to_string(),
                         None,
                         None,
                     )
@@ -461,3 +511,212 @@ pub async fn recover_password(
         }
     }
 }
+
+/// Compute the BSON expiry timestamp for a freshly issued refresh token, from
+/// the configured refresh lifetime on the JWT service.
+fn refresh_expiry_bson(jwt: &crate::auth::JwtService) -> mongodb::bson::DateTime {
+    let now = std::time::SystemTime::now();
+    let expiry = now + jwt.refresh_expiry().to_std().unwrap_or_default();
+    mongodb::bson::DateTime::from_system_time(expiry)
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct RefreshRequest {
+    pub refresh_token: String,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
+pub struct RefreshResponse {
+    pub token: String,
+    pub refresh_token: String,
+}
+
+/// Exchange a valid refresh token for a new access/refresh pair (rotation).
+///
+/// Validation: signature + expiry (JWT), then the token must exist in Mongo,
+/// not be revoked, and not have passed its stored `expiresAt`; finally the
+/// user's current `token_version` must match the refresh token's claim (so a
+/// password change invalidates refresh tokens too). The old refresh token is
+/// revoked and a new one issued + stored.
+pub async fn refresh(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Json(req): Json<RefreshRequest>,
+) -> impl IntoResponse {
+    // 1. Signature + expiry check on the presented refresh token.
+    let refresh_claims = match state.jwt_service.validate_refresh_token(&req.refresh_token) {
+        Ok(c) => c,
+        Err(_) => {
+            return (
+                StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+                Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "invalid refresh token" })),
+            )
+                .into_response()
+        }
+    };
+
+    // 2. Must exist and be active in the store.
+    let record = match state.refresh_token_repo.as_ref() {
+        Some(repo) => match repo.find_by_raw_token(&req.refresh_token).await {
+            Ok(Some(r)) => r,
+            Ok(None) => {
+                return (
+                    StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+                    Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "invalid refresh token" })),
+                )
+                    .into_response()
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::error!("Refresh token lookup failed: {}", e);
+                return (
+                    StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                    Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "database error" })),
+                )
+                    .into_response();
+            }
+        },
+        None => {
+            tracing::error!("Refresh token repository not configured");
+            return (
+                StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "server misconfiguration" })),
+            )
+                .into_response();
+        }
+    };
+
+    if record.revoked {
+        return (
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+            Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "refresh token revoked" })),
+        )
+            .into_response();
+    }
+    if record.expires_at <= mongodb::bson::DateTime::now() {
+        return (
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+            Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "refresh token expired" })),
+        )
+            .into_response();
+    }
+
+    // 3. Load the user and verify token_version matches.
+    let user_id = match ObjectId::parse_str(&refresh_claims.sub) {
+        Ok(oid) => oid,
+        Err(_) => {
+            return (
+                StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+                Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "invalid refresh token" })),
+            )
+                .into_response()
+        }
+    };
+    let user = match state.db.find_user_by_id(&user_id).await {
+        Ok(Some(u)) => u,
+        Ok(None) => {
+            return (
+                StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+                Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "invalid refresh token" })),
+            )
+                .into_response()
+        }
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::error!("Failed to load user during refresh: {}", e);
+            return (
+                StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "database error" })),
+            )
+                .into_response();
+        }
+    };
+    if user.token_version != refresh_claims.token_version {
+        return (
+            StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+            Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "credentials have changed; please log in again" })),
+        )
+            .into_response();
+    }
+
+    // 4. Rotate: revoke the old refresh token, issue a new pair, store the new
+    //    refresh token.
+    if let Some(ref repo) = state.refresh_token_repo {
+        if let Some(old_id) = record.id {
+            if let Err(e) = repo.revoke(&old_id).await {
+                tracing::warn!("Failed to revoke old refresh token: {}", e);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    let claims = Claims::new(
+        user_id.to_string(),
+        user.email.clone(),
+        user.token_version,
+        state.jwt_service.access_expiry(),
+    );
+    let (access_token, new_refresh_token) = match state.jwt_service.generate_tokens(claims) {
+        Ok(t) => t,
+        Err(e) => {
+            tracing::error!("Failed to generate token: {}", e);
+            return (
+                StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "failed to generate token" })),
+            )
+                .into_response();
+        }
+    };
+    if let Some(ref repo) = state.refresh_token_repo {
+        let expires_at = refresh_expiry_bson(&state.jwt_service);
+        if let Err(e) = repo
+            .create(&user_id.to_string(), &new_refresh_token, expires_at)
+            .await
+        {
+            tracing::warn!("Failed to persist rotated refresh token: {}", e);
+        }
+    }
+
+    (
+        StatusCode::OK,
+        Json(RefreshResponse {
+            token: access_token,
+            refresh_token: new_refresh_token,
+        }),
+    )
+        .into_response()
+}
+
+/// Revoke a single refresh token (client-side logout). The access token remains
+/// valid until its short expiry; this prevents the refresh token from minting
+/// any further access tokens.
+pub async fn logout(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Json(req): Json<RefreshRequest>,
+) -> impl IntoResponse {
+    if let Some(ref repo) = state.refresh_token_repo {
+        match repo.find_by_raw_token(&req.refresh_token).await {
+            Ok(Some(record)) => {
+                if let Some(id) = record.id {
+                    if let Err(e) = repo.revoke(&id).await {
+                        tracing::warn!("Failed to revoke refresh token on logout: {}", e);
+                        return (
+                            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                            Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "database error" })),
+                        )
+                            .into_response();
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            Ok(None) => {
+                // Already gone or never existed — treat as success (idempotent).
+            }
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::error!("Refresh token lookup failed on logout: {}", e);
+                return (
+                    StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                    Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "database error" })),
+                )
+                    .into_response();
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    StatusCode::NO_CONTENT.into_response()
+}

backend/src/handlers/mod.rs

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ pub mod shares;
 pub mod users;
 
 // Re-export commonly used handler functions
-pub use auth::{login, recover_password, register};
+pub use auth::{login, logout, recover_password, refresh, register};
 pub use health::{health_check, ready_check};
 pub use health_stats::{
     create_health_stat, delete_health_stat, get_health_stat, get_health_trends, list_health_stats,

backend/src/handlers/users.rs

@@ -3,7 +3,10 @@ use mongodb::bson::oid::ObjectId;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use validator::Validate;
 
-use crate::{auth::jwt::Claims, config::AppState, models::user::User};
+use crate::{
+    auth::jwt::Claims, config::AppState, middleware::ClientIp, models::audit_log::AuditEventType,
+    models::user::User,
+};
 
 #[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
 pub struct UserProfileResponse {
@@ -162,6 +165,7 @@ pub struct ChangePasswordRequest {
 pub async fn change_password(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
     Extension(claims): Extension<Claims>,
+    Extension(client_ip): Extension<ClientIp>,
     Json(req): Json<ChangePasswordRequest>,
 ) -> impl IntoResponse {
     if let Err(errors) = req.validate() {
@@ -175,7 +179,18 @@ pub async fn change_password(
             .into_response();
     }
 
-    let user_id = ObjectId::parse_str(&claims.sub).unwrap();
+    // The middleware already validated this against a real user, but guard
+    // against a malformed subject anyway rather than panicking.
+    let user_id = match ObjectId::parse_str(&claims.sub) {
+        Ok(oid) => oid,
+        Err(_) => {
+            return (
+                StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+                Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "invalid token" })),
+            )
+                .into_response()
+        }
+    };
 
     let mut user = match state.db.find_user_by_id(&user_id).await {
         Ok(Some(u)) => u,
@@ -224,7 +239,7 @@ pub async fn change_password(
         }
     }
 
-    // Update password
+    // Update password (this also bumps token_version in memory)
     match user.update_password(req.new_password) {
         Ok(_) => {}
         Err(e) => {
@@ -240,7 +255,33 @@ pub async fn change_password(
     }
 
     match state.db.update_user(&user).await {
-        Ok(_) => (StatusCode::NO_CONTENT, ()).into_response(),
+        Ok(_) => {
+            // Invalidate all sessions: the bumped token_version rejects existing
+            // access tokens, and we revoke every refresh token immediately so
+            // they can't mint new access tokens.
+            if let Some(ref repo) = state.refresh_token_repo {
+                if let Err(e) = repo.revoke_all_by_user(&user_id.to_string()).await {
+                    tracing::warn!("Failed to revoke refresh tokens on password change: {}", e);
+                }
+            }
+            state.token_version_cache.invalidate(&user_id).await;
+
+            // Audit the credential change.
+            if let Some(ref audit) = state.audit_logger {
+                let _ = audit
+                    .log_event(
+                        AuditEventType::PasswordChanged,
+                        Some(user_id),
+                        Some(user.email.clone()),
+                        client_ip.as_str().to_string(),
+                        None,
+                        None,
+                    )
+                    .await;
+            }
+
+            (StatusCode::NO_CONTENT, ()).into_response()
+        }
         Err(e) => {
             tracing::error!("Failed to update user: {}", e);
             (

backend/src/main.rs

@@ -70,6 +70,25 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
     // Get the underlying MongoDB database for security services
     let database = db.get_database();
 
+    // Ensure collections/indexes exist (best-effort; failures are logged, not
+    // fatal). Includes the refresh_tokens tokenHash-unique + expiresAt TTL
+    // indexes and the previously-never-run users.email unique index.
+    if let Err(e) = db::DatabaseInitializer::new(database.clone())
+        .initialize()
+        .await
+    {
+        tracing::warn!("Database index initialization skipped: {}", e);
+    }
+
+    // Short-TTL cache of token_version, so the JWT middleware can reject stale
+    // access tokens without a Mongo lookup per request.
+    let token_version_cache = std::sync::Arc::new(auth::TokenVersionCache::with_default_ttl());
+
+    // Persisted refresh tokens (hashed) for rotation/revocation.
+    let refresh_token_repo = std::sync::Arc::new(
+        models::refresh_token::RefreshTokenRepository::new(&database),
+    );
+
     // Initialize security services (Phase 2.6)
     let audit_logger = security::AuditLogger::new(&database);
     let session_manager = security::SessionManager::new(&database);
@@ -101,6 +120,8 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
         health_stats_repo: Some(health_stats_repo),
         mongo_client: None,
         interaction_service: Some(interaction_service),
+        token_version_cache,
+        refresh_token_repo: Some(refresh_token_repo),
     };
 
     eprintln!("Building router with security middleware...");
@@ -114,6 +135,8 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
         .route("/ready", get(handlers::ready_check))
         .route("/api/auth/register", post(handlers::register))
         .route("/api/auth/login", post(handlers::login))
+        .route("/api/auth/refresh", post(handlers::refresh))
+        .route("/api/auth/logout", post(handlers::logout))
         .route(
             "/api/auth/recover-password",
             post(handlers::recover_password),
@@ -175,6 +198,11 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
         .with_state(state)
         .layer(
             ServiceBuilder::new()
+                // Resolve the client IP once and stash it for handlers/middleware
+                // (audit logging, account-lockout forensics).
+                .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(
+                    middleware::client_ip_middleware,
+                ))
                 // Add security headers first (applies to all responses)
                 .layer(axum::middleware::from_fn(
                     middleware::security_headers_middleware
@@ -193,7 +221,14 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
     eprintln!("Server listening on {}", &addr);
     tracing::info!("Server listening on {}", &addr);
 
-    axum::serve(listener, app).await?;
+    // into_make_service_with_connect_info makes ConnectInfo<SocketAddr> available
+    // to the client_ip_middleware so we can fall back to the peer address when no
+    // proxy header (X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP) is present.
+    axum::serve(
+        listener,
+        app.into_make_service_with_connect_info::<std::net::SocketAddr>(),
+    )
+    .await?;
 
     Ok(())
 }

backend/src/middleware/auth.rs

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ use axum::{
     middleware::Next,
     response::Response,
 };
+use mongodb::bson::oid::ObjectId;
 
 pub async fn jwt_auth_middleware(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
@@ -29,12 +30,26 @@ pub async fn jwt_auth_middleware(
 
     let token = &auth_header[7..]; // Remove "Bearer " prefix
 
-    // Verify token
+    // Verify signature and expiry.
     let claims = state
         .jwt_service
         .validate_token(token)
         .map_err(|_| StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
 
+    // Reject tokens whose version is stale (e.g. issued before a password
+    // change). The user's current version is cached briefly so we don't hit
+    // Mongo on every request; a missing user (deleted) also means 401.
+    let user_oid = ObjectId::parse_str(&claims.sub).map_err(|_| StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
+    let current_version = state
+        .token_version_cache
+        .get_or_load(&user_oid, &state.db)
+        .await
+        .map_err(|_| StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED)?;
+    match current_version {
+        Some(v) if v == claims.token_version => {}
+        _ => return Err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED),
+    }
+
     // Add claims to request extensions for handlers to use
     req.extensions_mut().insert(claims);
 

backend/src/middleware/client_ip.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+//! Resolves the originating client IP for each request and exposes it to
+//! handlers via the [`ClientIp`] request extension.
+//!
+//! Resolution order (most-trusted first):
+//! 1. `X-Forwarded-For` — first hop (the original client). Normogen is deployed
+//!    behind a reverse proxy on Solaria, so this is the primary source.
+//! 2. `X-Real-IP` — common single-IP proxy header.
+//! 3. The peer address from Axum's `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` (direct connection).
+//! 4. `"0.0.0.0"` only if none of the above are present.
+
+#![allow(dead_code)]
+use axum::{
+    extract::ConnectInfo, extract::Request, http::HeaderMap, middleware::Next, response::Response,
+};
+use std::net::SocketAddr;
+
+/// Header carrying the originating client chain (proxy-populated).
+const X_FORWARDED_FOR: &str = "x-forwarded-for";
+/// Header some proxies set to the single originating IP.
+const X_REAL_IP: &str = "x-real-ip";
+/// Fallback when no IP can be determined.
+const UNKNOWN_IP: &str = "0.0.0.0";
+
+/// Extractor carrying the resolved client IP, inserted by [`client_ip_middleware`].
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct ClientIp(pub String);
+
+impl ClientIp {
+    pub fn as_str(&self) -> &str {
+        &self.0
+    }
+}
+
+impl std::ops::Deref for ClientIp {
+    type Target = str;
+    fn deref(&self) -> &str {
+        &self.0
+    }
+}
+
+/// Resolve the client IP from request headers, falling back to the peer socket.
+///
+/// Pure and unit-testable: pass the headers and an optional `ConnectInfo`.
+pub fn extract_client_ip(headers: &HeaderMap, conn: Option<&ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>) -> String {
+    // X-Forwarded-For: "client, proxy1, proxy2" — the leftmost entry is the
+    // original client. Only validate it looks like an IP; take the first token.
+    if let Some(xff) = headers.get(X_FORWARDED_FOR).and_then(|h| h.to_str().ok()) {
+        if let Some(first) = xff.split(',').map(str::trim).find(|s| !s.is_empty()) {
+            return first.to_string();
+        }
+    }
+
+    // X-Real-IP: single IP.
+    if let Some(ip) = headers.get(X_REAL_IP).and_then(|h| h.to_str().ok()) {
+        let ip = ip.trim();
+        if !ip.is_empty() {
+            return ip.to_string();
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Direct peer address, when ConnectInfo is wired (see main.rs).
+    if let Some(info) = conn {
+        return info.0.ip().to_string();
+    }
+
+    UNKNOWN_IP.to_string()
+}
+
+/// Middleware that computes the client IP once and stashes it in request
+/// extensions so handlers can pull it out with `Extension(ClientIp(..))`.
+pub async fn client_ip_middleware(mut req: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
+    let conn = req.extensions().get::<ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>>();
+    let ip = extract_client_ip(req.headers(), conn);
+    req.extensions_mut().insert(ClientIp(ip));
+    next.run(req).await
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use axum::extract::ConnectInfo;
+    use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, SocketAddr};
+
+    fn headers() -> HeaderMap {
+        HeaderMap::new()
+    }
+
+    fn conn() -> ConnectInfo<SocketAddr> {
+        ConnectInfo(SocketAddr::new(
+            IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(203, 0, 113, 7)),
+            12345,
+        ))
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn prefers_x_forwarded_for_first_hop() {
+        let mut h = headers();
+        h.insert(
+            X_FORWARDED_FOR,
+            "198.51.100.2, 10.0.0.1, 10.0.0.2".parse().unwrap(),
+        );
+        assert_eq!(extract_client_ip(&h, Some(&conn())), "198.51.100.2");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn falls_back_to_x_real_ip_when_no_xff() {
+        let mut h = headers();
+        h.insert(X_REAL_IP, "198.51.100.9".parse().unwrap());
+        assert_eq!(extract_client_ip(&h, Some(&conn())), "198.51.100.9");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn xff_takes_precedence_over_x_real_ip() {
+        let mut h = headers();
+        h.insert(X_FORWARDED_FOR, "198.51.100.2".parse().unwrap());
+        h.insert(X_REAL_IP, "10.0.0.99".parse().unwrap());
+        assert_eq!(extract_client_ip(&h, Some(&conn())), "198.51.100.2");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn uses_socket_when_no_proxy_headers() {
+        assert_eq!(extract_client_ip(&headers(), Some(&conn())), "203.0.113.7");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn unknown_when_nothing_available() {
+        assert_eq!(extract_client_ip(&headers(), None), UNKNOWN_IP);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ignores_blank_xff_entries() {
+        let mut h = headers();
+        // Leading whitespace/empty entry should be skipped, not returned blank.
+        h.insert(X_FORWARDED_FOR, "  , 10.0.0.5".parse().unwrap());
+        assert_eq!(extract_client_ip(&h, None), "10.0.0.5");
+    }
+}

backend/src/middleware/mod.rs

@@ -1,7 +1,11 @@
 pub mod auth;
+pub mod client_ip;
 pub mod rate_limit;
 
 pub use auth::jwt_auth_middleware;
+pub use client_ip::{client_ip_middleware, ClientIp};
+// `extract_client_ip` is `pub` in the client_ip module and used by its own
+// tests; handlers consume the resolved IP via the `ClientIp` extractor instead.
 pub use rate_limit::general_rate_limit_middleware;
 
 // Simple security headers middleware

backend/src/models/refresh_token.rs

@@ -1,18 +1,24 @@
 #![allow(dead_code)]
-#![allow(unused_imports)]
+use anyhow::Result;
-use mongodb::bson::{oid::ObjectId, DateTime};
+use base64::Engine;
+use mongodb::{
+    bson::{doc, oid::ObjectId, DateTime},
+    Collection,
+};
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
 
+/// A persisted, rotated refresh token. Only the SHA-256 hash of the raw JWT
+/// refresh token is ever stored — the plaintext lives only inside the signed
+/// JWT handed to the client.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct RefreshToken {
     #[serde(rename = "_id", skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
     pub id: Option<ObjectId>,
-    #[serde(rename = "tokenId")]
-    pub token_id: String,
-    #[serde(rename = "userId")]
-    pub user_id: String,
     #[serde(rename = "tokenHash")]
     pub token_hash: String,
+    #[serde(rename = "userId")]
+    pub user_id: String,
     #[serde(rename = "expiresAt")]
     pub expires_at: DateTime,
     #[serde(rename = "createdAt")]
@@ -22,3 +28,119 @@ pub struct RefreshToken {
     #[serde(rename = "revokedAt")]
     pub revoked_at: Option<DateTime>,
 }
+
+/// SHA-256 the raw refresh token and base64-encode the digest. Two equal
+/// tokens produce equal hashes, so lookups work; the plaintext is never stored.
+pub fn hash_token(token: &str) -> String {
+    let digest = Sha256::digest(token.as_bytes());
+    base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(digest)
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct RefreshTokenRepository {
+    collection: Collection<RefreshToken>,
+}
+
+impl RefreshTokenRepository {
+    pub fn new(db: &mongodb::Database) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            collection: db.collection("refresh_tokens"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Persist a refresh token record from its raw JWT form. Hashes the token
+    /// before storage.
+    pub async fn create(
+        &self,
+        user_id: &str,
+        raw_token: &str,
+        expires_at: DateTime,
+    ) -> Result<ObjectId> {
+        let now = DateTime::now();
+        let record = RefreshToken {
+            id: None,
+            token_hash: hash_token(raw_token),
+            user_id: user_id.to_string(),
+            expires_at,
+            created_at: now,
+            revoked: false,
+            revoked_at: None,
+        };
+
+        let id = self
+            .collection
+            .insert_one(record, None)
+            .await?
+            .inserted_id
+            .as_object_id()
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Failed to get inserted refresh token id"))?;
+        Ok(id)
+    }
+
+    /// Look up a token record by its raw JWT form. Returns `None` if not found.
+    /// Callers must still check `revoked` and `expires_at`.
+    pub async fn find_by_raw_token(&self, raw_token: &str) -> Result<Option<RefreshToken>> {
+        let hash = hash_token(raw_token);
+        let record = self
+            .collection
+            .find_one(doc! { "tokenHash": hash }, None)
+            .await?;
+        Ok(record)
+    }
+
+    /// Mark a single token record (by id) as revoked.
+    pub async fn revoke(&self, id: &ObjectId) -> Result<()> {
+        self.collection
+            .update_one(
+                doc! { "_id": id },
+                doc! {
+                    "$set": {
+                        "revoked": true,
+                        "revokedAt": DateTime::now()
+                    }
+                },
+                None,
+            )
+            .await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    /// Revoke every active refresh token for a user. Called on credential
+    /// changes (password change / recovery) and explicit "logout everywhere".
+    pub async fn revoke_all_by_user(&self, user_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
+        self.collection
+            .update_many(
+                doc! { "userId": user_id, "revoked": false },
+                doc! {
+                    "$set": {
+                        "revoked": true,
+                        "revokedAt": DateTime::now()
+                    }
+                },
+                None,
+            )
+            .await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn hash_token_is_deterministic() {
+        assert_eq!(hash_token("abc"), hash_token("abc"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn hash_token_differs_for_different_input() {
+        assert_ne!(hash_token("abc"), hash_token("abd"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn hash_token_is_base64_sha256_length() {
+        // SHA-256 = 32 bytes -> 44 base64 chars (standard alphabet, padded).
+        assert_eq!(hash_token("anything").len(), 44);
+    }
+}