fix(backend): P0 security hardening pass
Address the four P0 security items from the project review: * token_version validation (#1): the JWT middleware now rejects access tokens whose token_version claim is stale (e.g. issued before a password change). A short-TTL (30s) in-memory cache (TokenVersionCache) avoids a Mongo lookup per request; credential changes invalidate the cache immediately on the handling instance. * Fail-fast config (#2): add APP_ENVIRONMENT (development|production). In production the server refuses to boot unless JWT_SECRET and ENCRYPTION_KEY are set to non-default values; development keeps the insecure defaults with a warning. * Real client IP in audit logs (#4): new client_ip middleware resolves the originating IP (X-Forwarded-For > X-Real-IP > ConnectInfo socket) and exposes it via a ClientIp extractor. All five hardcoded "0.0.0.0" audit calls are replaced, and the missing PasswordChanged audit event is added to change_password. axum::serve now uses into_make_service_with_connect_info. * Refresh token persistence (#5): refresh tokens are now stored hashed in MongoDB (RefreshTokenRepository) instead of an in-memory map lost on restart. Added /api/auth/refresh (with rotation + token_version check) and /api/auth/logout routes; register/login return a refresh_token; password change/recovery revoke all of a user's refresh tokens. JwtService now honors JwtConfig expiries instead of hardcoding 15min/30d, and the dead in-memory refresh store is removed. Also: wire up DatabaseInitializer (was never called), fix the refresh_tokens index to tokenHash + add an expiresAt TTL index, add sha2 dep. Rate limiting (#3) is deferred per scope; the stub remains. Verified: cargo fmt --check clean, cargo build/clippy --all-targets clean, 18 unit tests pass (9 new). Integration tests (tests/*) still need a live server — fixing them is tracked as P1. BREAKING CHANGE: AuthResponse now includes a refresh_token field.
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RUST_LOG=info
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# Deployment environment.
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# development (default) — allows insecure JWT_SECRET/ENCRYPTION_KEY defaults (with warnings).
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# production — REFUSES to boot unless JWT_SECRET and ENCRYPTION_KEY are set to
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# strong, non-default values.
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APP_ENVIRONMENT=development
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SERVER_HOST=0.0.0.0
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SERVER_PORT=8000
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MONGODB_URI=mongodb://mongodb:27017
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MONGODB_DATABASE=normogen
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JWT_SECRET=change-this-to-a-random-secret-key
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# Generate with: openssl rand -base64 48
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# MUST be changed and MUST NOT equal "secret" when APP_ENVIRONMENT=production.
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JWT_SECRET=change-this-to-a-strong-random-secret-key
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JWT_ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRY_MINUTES=15
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JWT_REFRESH_TOKEN_EXPIRY_DAYS=30
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# MUST be set (and not the default) when APP_ENVIRONMENT=production.
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ENCRYPTION_KEY=change-this-to-a-32-byte-key
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