Merge feat/zk-recovery
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Zero-knowledge recovery (Phase 2): wrapped-DEK model so a forgotten password
doesn't lose encrypted data. Recovery via recovery-phrase-derived KEK.
This commit is contained in:
goose 2026-06-29 03:42:28 -03:00
commit 4a63b1c972
13 changed files with 528 additions and 67 deletions

View file

@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ pub fn build_app(state: AppState) -> Router {
.route(
"/api/auth/recover-password",
post(handlers::recover_password),
);
)
.route("/api/auth/recovery-info", get(handlers::recovery_info));
// Build protected routes (auth required)
let protected_routes = Router::new()

View file

@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
use axum::{extract::Extension, extract::State, http::StatusCode, response::IntoResponse, Json};
use axum::{
extract::Extension, extract::Query, extract::State, http::StatusCode, response::IntoResponse,
Json,
};
use mongodb::bson::oid::ObjectId;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use validator::Validate;
@ -16,8 +19,14 @@ pub struct RegisterRequest {
pub username: String,
#[validate(length(min = 8))]
pub password: String,
/// Optional recovery phrase for password recovery
/// Optional recovery phrase hash (for server-side verification)
pub recovery_phrase: Option<String>,
/// Wrapped DEK (base64 ciphertext) — encrypted under the password KEK
pub wrapped_dek: Option<String>,
pub wrapped_dek_iv: Option<String>,
/// Wrapped DEK (base64 ciphertext) — encrypted under the recovery KEK
pub recovery_wrapped_dek: Option<String>,
pub recovery_wrapped_dek_iv: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
@ -27,6 +36,10 @@ pub struct AuthResponse {
pub user_id: String,
pub email: String,
pub username: String,
/// Wrapped DEK + IV (for the client to unwrap at login). Absent if the
/// user has no wrapped DEK (legacy/pre-recovery accounts).
pub wrapped_dek: Option<String>,
pub wrapped_dek_iv: Option<String>,
}
pub async fn register(
@ -70,11 +83,11 @@ pub async fn register(
}
// Create new user
let user = match User::new(
let mut user = match User::new(
req.email.clone(),
req.username.clone(),
req.password,
req.recovery_phrase,
req.recovery_phrase.clone(),
) {
Ok(u) => u,
Err(e) => {
@ -89,6 +102,13 @@ pub async fn register(
}
};
// Store the wrapped-DEK fields (zero-knowledge: server stores verbatim).
user.wrapped_dek = req.wrapped_dek;
user.wrapped_dek_iv = req.wrapped_dek_iv;
user.recovery_wrapped_dek = req.recovery_wrapped_dek.clone();
user.recovery_wrapped_dek_iv = req.recovery_wrapped_dek_iv.clone();
user.recovery_enabled = req.recovery_wrapped_dek.is_some();
// Get token_version before saving
let token_version = user.token_version;
@ -179,8 +199,10 @@ pub async fn register(
token,
refresh_token,
user_id: user_id.to_string(),
email: user.email,
username: user.username,
email: user.email.clone(),
username: user.username.clone(),
wrapped_dek: user.wrapped_dek.clone(),
wrapped_dek_iv: user.wrapped_dek_iv.clone(),
};
(StatusCode::CREATED, Json(response)).into_response()
@ -387,8 +409,10 @@ pub async fn login(
token,
refresh_token,
user_id: user_id.to_string(),
email: user.email,
username: user.username,
email: user.email.clone(),
username: user.username.clone(),
wrapped_dek: user.wrapped_dek.clone(),
wrapped_dek_iv: user.wrapped_dek_iv.clone(),
};
(StatusCode::OK, Json(response)).into_response()
@ -398,10 +422,61 @@ pub async fn login(
pub struct RecoverPasswordRequest {
#[validate(email)]
pub email: String,
/// The recovery-phrase-derived proof (base64) — the server verifies it
/// against the stored recovery_phrase_hash.
#[validate(length(min = 1))]
pub recovery_phrase: String,
/// The new auth secret (base64) — the server hashes it as the new password.
#[validate(length(min = 8))]
pub new_password: String,
/// The DEK re-wrapped under the new password KEK (base64 ciphertext + IV).
pub new_wrapped_dek: Option<String>,
pub new_wrapped_dek_iv: Option<String>,
}
/// GET /api/auth/recovery-info?email=... — returns the recovery-wrapped DEK so
/// the client can unwrap it with the recovery phrase. Public (the wrapped DEK
/// is useless without the recovery phrase).
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
pub struct RecoveryInfoQuery {
pub email: String,
}
pub async fn recovery_info(
State(state): State<AppState>,
Query(query): Query<RecoveryInfoQuery>,
) -> impl IntoResponse {
let user = match state.db.find_user_by_email(&query.email).await {
Ok(Some(u)) => u,
Ok(None) => {
// Don't reveal whether the email exists — return disabled.
return (
StatusCode::OK,
Json(serde_json::json!({
"recovery_enabled": false,
})),
)
.into_response();
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::error!("Recovery info lookup failed: {}", e);
return (
StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
Json(serde_json::json!({ "error": "database error" })),
)
.into_response();
}
};
(
StatusCode::OK,
Json(serde_json::json!({
"recovery_enabled": user.recovery_enabled,
"recovery_wrapped_dek": user.recovery_wrapped_dek,
"recovery_wrapped_dek_iv": user.recovery_wrapped_dek_iv,
})),
)
.into_response()
}
pub async fn recover_password(
@ -468,9 +543,14 @@ pub async fn recover_password(
}
}
// Update password
// Update password + store the new wrapped DEK (re-wrapped client-side under
// the new password KEK). The server never sees the DEK itself.
match user.update_password(req.new_password) {
Ok(_) => {}
Ok(_) => {
// Store the re-wrapped DEK so the new password can unlock it.
user.wrapped_dek = req.new_wrapped_dek;
user.wrapped_dek_iv = req.new_wrapped_dek_iv;
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::error!("Failed to update password: {}", e);
return (

View file

@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ pub mod users;
pub use appointments::{
create_appointment, delete_appointment, get_appointment, list_appointments, update_appointment,
};
pub use auth::{login, logout, recover_password, refresh, register};
pub use auth::{login, logout, recover_password, recovery_info, refresh, register};
pub use health::{health_check, ready_check};
pub use health_stats::{
create_health_stat, delete_health_stat, get_health_stat, get_health_trends, list_health_stats,

View file

@ -187,6 +187,10 @@ pub struct ChangePasswordRequest {
pub current_password: String,
#[validate(length(min = 8))]
pub new_password: String,
/// Re-wrapped DEK under the new password KEK (zero-knowledge: the client
/// re-wraps the DEK before sending).
pub new_wrapped_dek: Option<String>,
pub new_wrapped_dek_iv: Option<String>,
}
pub async fn change_password(
@ -268,7 +272,11 @@ pub async fn change_password(
// Update password (this also bumps token_version in memory)
match user.update_password(req.new_password) {
Ok(_) => {}
Ok(_) => {
// Store the re-wrapped DEK (zero-knowledge: client re-wrapped it).
user.wrapped_dek = req.new_wrapped_dek;
user.wrapped_dek_iv = req.new_wrapped_dek_iv;
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::error!("Failed to hash new password: {}", e);
return (

View file

@ -23,6 +23,20 @@ pub struct User {
/// Whether password recovery is enabled for this user
pub recovery_enabled: bool,
/// Wrapped DEK (data encryption key) — the DEK encrypted under the password
/// KEK. Base64 ciphertext. The server stores this verbatim; only the client
/// can unwrap it. (Phase 2 zero-knowledge recovery.)
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub wrapped_dek: Option<String>,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub wrapped_dek_iv: Option<String>,
/// Wrapped DEK under the recovery KEK — for password recovery.
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub recovery_wrapped_dek: Option<String>,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub recovery_wrapped_dek_iv: Option<String>,
/// Token version for invalidating all tokens on password change
pub token_version: i32,
@ -75,6 +89,10 @@ impl User {
password_hash,
recovery_phrase_hash,
recovery_enabled,
wrapped_dek: None,
wrapped_dek_iv: None,
recovery_wrapped_dek: None,
recovery_wrapped_dek_iv: None,
token_version: 0,
created_at: now,
last_active: now,

View file

@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
import { BrowserRouter, Routes, Route, Navigate } from 'react-router-dom';
import { LoginPage } from './pages/LoginPage';
import { RegisterPage } from './pages/RegisterPage';
import { RecoveryPage } from './pages/RecoveryPage';
import { Dashboard } from './pages/Dashboard';
import { ProtectedRoute } from './components/common/ProtectedRoute';
@ -11,6 +12,7 @@ function App() {
{/* Public routes */}
<Route path="/login" element={<LoginPage />} />
<Route path="/register" element={<RegisterPage />} />
<Route path="/recover" element={<RecoveryPage />} />
{/* Protected routes */}
<Route

View file

@ -1,11 +1,22 @@
export {
deriveAuthSecret,
deriveAuthAndEncKeys,
generateDek,
wrapDek,
unwrapDek,
rewrapDek,
setupEncryption,
unlockWithPassword,
unlockWithRecovery,
setEncKey,
getEncKey,
clearEncKey,
hasEncKey,
AUTH_SALT,
ENC_SALT,
PASSWORD_KEK_SALT,
RECOVERY_KEK_SALT,
type EncryptionSetup,
type UnlockResult,
} from './keys';
export {
encrypt,

View file

@ -1,64 +1,49 @@
/**
* Zero-knowledge key derivation.
* Zero-knowledge key management with wrapped-DEK recovery (Phase 2).
*
* From the user's password we derive TWO independent values via PBKDF2:
* Key model:
* - DEK (Data Encryption Key): a random AES-256-GCM key used to encrypt/decrypt
* all user data. Lives in memory only.
* - KEK (Key Encryption Key): derived from the password (or recovery phrase)
* via PBKDF2. Used to wrap (encrypt) the DEK for storage on the server.
*
* - `authSecret`: base64 bytes sent to the server as the "password". The
* server PBKDF2-hashes it (as it always has). The server can never derive
* the encryption key from this value.
* - `encKey`: an AES-GCM CryptoKey kept in memory only (never persisted,
* never transmitted). Used to encrypt/decrypt all user data.
* The server stores two wrapped forms of the DEK:
* - password_wrapped_dek: DEK encrypted under KEK(password)
* - recovery_wrapped_dek: DEK encrypted under KEK(recovery_phrase)
*
* Two separate PBKDF2 passes with app-wide domain-separation salts prevent the
* server from deriving `encKey` even if it logs or leaks `authSecret`.
* Recovery: derive KEK(recovery_phrase) unwrap the DEK re-wrap under the
* new password's KEK. The server never holds the DEK or any KEK.
*/
import { encrypt, decrypt, type CipherPayload } from './cipher';
const PBKDF2_ITERATIONS = 150_000;
const KEY_BITS = 256; // AES-256
const KEY_BITS = 256;
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
// Domain-separation salts for each PBKDF2 purpose.
export const AUTH_SALT = 'normogen-auth-v1';
export const ENC_SALT = 'normogen-enc-v1';
export const PASSWORD_KEK_SALT = 'normogen-kek-password-v1';
export const RECOVERY_KEK_SALT = 'normogen-kek-recovery-v1';
/**
* Derive the auth secret (base64) and encryption key (CryptoKey) from a password.
*/
export async function deriveAuthAndEncKeys(password: string): Promise<{
authSecret: string;
encKey: CryptoKey;
}> {
const passwordKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Low-level: PBKDF2 derivation helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
async function pbkdf2DeriveBits(password: string, salt: string): Promise<ArrayBuffer> {
const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
'raw',
encoder.encode(password),
encoder.encode(password) as BufferSource,
'PBKDF2',
false,
['deriveBits'],
);
// Auth secret: 32 raw bytes, base64-encoded for transport.
const authBits = await crypto.subtle.deriveBits(
{ name: 'PBKDF2', salt: encoder.encode(AUTH_SALT), iterations: PBKDF2_ITERATIONS, hash: 'SHA-256' },
passwordKey,
return crypto.subtle.deriveBits(
{ name: 'PBKDF2', salt: encoder.encode(salt) as BufferSource, iterations: PBKDF2_ITERATIONS, hash: 'SHA-256' },
key,
KEY_BITS,
);
const authSecret = base64(new Uint8Array(authBits));
// Encryption key: importable AES-GCM key, non-extractable.
const encBits = await crypto.subtle.deriveBits(
{ name: 'PBKDF2', salt: encoder.encode(ENC_SALT), iterations: PBKDF2_ITERATIONS, hash: 'SHA-256' },
passwordKey,
KEY_BITS,
);
const encKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
'raw',
encBits,
{ name: 'AES-GCM' },
false,
['encrypt', 'decrypt'],
);
return { authSecret, encKey };
}
function base64(bytes: Uint8Array): string {
@ -67,32 +52,182 @@ function base64(bytes: Uint8Array): string {
return btoa(bin);
}
/** Derive the auth secret (base64) from the password — sent to the server. */
export async function deriveAuthSecret(password: string): Promise<string> {
const bits = await pbkdf2DeriveBits(password, AUTH_SALT);
return base64(new Uint8Array(bits));
}
/** Derive a KEK (extractable AES-GCM key) from a password or recovery phrase. */
async function deriveKEK(secret: string, salt: string): Promise<CryptoKey> {
const bits = await pbkdf2DeriveBits(secret, salt);
return crypto.subtle.importKey(
'raw',
bits,
{ name: 'AES-GCM' },
true, // extractable so we can export for wrapping
['encrypt', 'decrypt'],
);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// In-memory encryption-key store.
//
// The encKey lives only in memory for the lifetime of the authenticated
// session (the tab). It is deliberately NOT persisted — losing the tab or
// closing the browser requires re-entering the password to re-derive it.
// DEK generation + wrapping
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/** Generate a random AES-256-GCM DEK (extractable for wrapping). */
export async function generateDek(): Promise<CryptoKey> {
return crypto.subtle.generateKey(
{ name: 'AES-GCM', length: KEY_BITS },
true, // extractable so we can export raw bytes for wrapping
['encrypt', 'decrypt'],
);
}
/** Export a DEK to raw bytes, encrypt (wrap) it under a KEK, return base64. */
export async function wrapDek(dek: CryptoKey, kek: CryptoKey): Promise<CipherPayload> {
const rawDek = await crypto.subtle.exportKey('raw', dek);
return encrypt(
new TextDecoder().decode(new Uint8Array(rawDek)),
kek,
);
}
/** Decrypt (unwrap) a wrapped DEK and import as a non-extractable AES-GCM key. */
export async function unwrapDek(payload: CipherPayload, kek: CryptoKey): Promise<CryptoKey> {
const rawDekB64 = await decrypt(payload, kek);
// The wrapped DEK was encrypted as a base64 string of the raw key bytes.
const rawDek = Uint8Array.from(atob(rawDekB64), (c) => c.charCodeAt(0));
return crypto.subtle.importKey(
'raw',
rawDek as BufferSource,
{ name: 'AES-GCM' },
false, // non-extractable in the session (can't be re-exported)
['encrypt', 'decrypt'],
);
}
/** Re-wrap a DEK under a new KEK (for password change / post-recovery). */
export async function rewrapDek(
dek: CryptoKey,
newSecret: string,
salt: string = PASSWORD_KEK_SALT,
): Promise<CipherPayload> {
const newKek = await deriveKEK(newSecret, salt);
return wrapDek(dek, newKek);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// High-level flows
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export interface EncryptionSetup {
authSecret: string;
dek: CryptoKey;
passwordWrappedDek: CipherPayload;
recoveryWrappedDek?: CipherPayload;
recoveryKekHash?: string; // base64 hash of the recovery KEK proof (for server verification)
}
/**
* Full setup at registration: derive auth secret, generate a DEK, wrap it under
* the password KEK and (optionally) the recovery-phrase KEK.
*/
export async function setupEncryption(
password: string,
recoveryPhrase?: string,
): Promise<EncryptionSetup> {
const authSecret = await deriveAuthSecret(password);
const dek = await generateDek();
const passwordKek = await deriveKEK(password, PASSWORD_KEK_SALT);
const passwordWrappedDek = await wrapDek(dek, passwordKek);
let recoveryWrappedDek: CipherPayload | undefined;
let recoveryKekHash: string | undefined;
if (recoveryPhrase) {
const recoveryKek = await deriveKEK(recoveryPhrase, RECOVERY_KEK_SALT);
recoveryWrappedDek = await wrapDek(dek, recoveryKek);
// A proof the server can verify: derive a separate value from the recovery
// phrase and hash it. The server stores this hash; at recovery time the
// client sends the derived value and the server PBKDF2-verifies it.
// We send the recovery auth proof (base64 of a PBKDF2 derivation).
recoveryKekHash = await deriveAuthSecret(recoveryPhrase); // reuse the auth derivation as the proof
}
return { authSecret, dek, passwordWrappedDek, recoveryWrappedDek, recoveryKekHash };
}
export interface UnlockResult {
authSecret: string;
dek: CryptoKey;
}
/**
* At login: derive the auth secret and unwrap the DEK from the password-wrapped form.
*/
export async function unlockWithPassword(
password: string,
passwordWrappedDek: CipherPayload,
): Promise<UnlockResult> {
const authSecret = await deriveAuthSecret(password);
const passwordKek = await deriveKEK(password, PASSWORD_KEK_SALT);
const dek = await unwrapDek(passwordWrappedDek, passwordKek);
return { authSecret, dek };
}
/**
* At recovery: unwrap the DEK from the recovery-wrapped form using the recovery phrase.
*/
export async function unlockWithRecovery(
recoveryPhrase: string,
recoveryWrappedDek: CipherPayload,
): Promise<CryptoKey> {
const recoveryKek = await deriveKEK(recoveryPhrase, RECOVERY_KEK_SALT);
return unwrapDek(recoveryWrappedDek, recoveryKek);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// In-memory key store (unchanged from Phase 1)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
let currentEncKey: CryptoKey | null = null;
/** Set the session encryption key (called on login/register). */
export function setEncKey(key: CryptoKey): void {
currentEncKey = key;
}
/** Get the session encryption key, or null if not authenticated. */
export function getEncKey(): CryptoKey | null {
return currentEncKey;
}
/** Clear the session encryption key (called on logout). */
export function clearEncKey(): void {
currentEncKey = null;
}
/** True if a session encryption key is available (i.e. the user can encrypt/decrypt). */
export function hasEncKey(): boolean {
return currentEncKey !== null;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Backward compat: the old deriveAuthAndEncKeys (Phase 1 direct-from-password
// enc key). Kept for tests; new code uses setupEncryption/unlockWithPassword.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
export async function deriveAuthAndEncKeys(password: string): Promise<{
authSecret: string;
encKey: CryptoKey;
}> {
const authSecret = await deriveAuthSecret(password);
// Phase 1 derived the enc key directly from the password. For backward compat
// with tests that don't have a wrapped DEK, derive it the old way.
const encBits = await pbkdf2DeriveBits(password, 'normogen-enc-v1');
const encKey = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
'raw',
encBits,
{ name: 'AES-GCM' },
false,
['encrypt', 'decrypt'],
);
return { authSecret, encKey };
}

View file

@ -103,6 +103,11 @@ export const LoginPage: React.FC = () => {
Don't have an account? Sign Up
</Typography>
</Link>
<Link to="/recover">
<Typography variant="body2" sx={{ mt: 1 }}>
Forgot password? Recover
</Typography>
</Link>
</Box>
</Box>
</Paper>

View file

@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
import { useState, type FC } from 'react';
import { useNavigate, Link } from 'react-router-dom';
import {
Container,
Paper,
TextField,
Button,
Typography,
Box,
Alert,
CircularProgress,
} from '@mui/material';
import { useAuthStore } from '../store/useStore';
export const RecoveryPage: FC = () => {
const navigate = useNavigate();
const { recover, isLoading, error, clearError } = useAuthStore();
const [email, setEmail] = useState('');
const [recoveryPhrase, setRecoveryPhrase] = useState('');
const [newPassword, setNewPassword] = useState('');
const [confirmPassword, setConfirmPassword] = useState('');
const [localError, setLocalError] = useState('');
const handleSubmit = async (e: React.FormEvent) => {
e.preventDefault();
clearError();
setLocalError('');
if (newPassword !== confirmPassword) {
setLocalError('Passwords do not match');
return;
}
if (newPassword.length < 8) {
setLocalError('Password must be at least 8 characters');
return;
}
try {
await recover(email, recoveryPhrase, newPassword);
navigate('/login', { replace: true });
} catch {
/* error surfaced via store */
}
};
return (
<Container maxWidth="sm">
<Box sx={{ mt: 4, display: 'flex', flexDirection: 'column', alignItems: 'center' }}>
<Paper elevation={3} sx={{ p: 4, width: '100%', borderRadius: 2 }}>
<Typography component="h1" variant="h4" align="center" gutterBottom>
Recover Account
</Typography>
<Typography variant="body2" align="center" color="text.secondary" sx={{ mb: 2 }}>
Enter your recovery phrase to reset your password and regain access to your encrypted data.
</Typography>
{(error || localError) && (
<Alert severity="error" sx={{ mb: 2 }}>
{error || localError}
</Alert>
)}
<Box component="form" onSubmit={handleSubmit}>
<TextField
margin="normal"
required
fullWidth
label="Email Address"
type="email"
value={email}
onChange={(e) => setEmail(e.target.value)}
disabled={isLoading}
autoFocus
/>
<TextField
margin="normal"
required
fullWidth
label="Recovery Phrase"
value={recoveryPhrase}
onChange={(e) => setRecoveryPhrase(e.target.value)}
disabled={isLoading}
/>
<TextField
margin="normal"
required
fullWidth
label="New Password"
type="password"
value={newPassword}
onChange={(e) => setNewPassword(e.target.value)}
disabled={isLoading}
/>
<TextField
margin="normal"
required
fullWidth
label="Confirm New Password"
type="password"
value={confirmPassword}
onChange={(e) => setConfirmPassword(e.target.value)}
disabled={isLoading}
/>
<Button
type="submit"
fullWidth
variant="contained"
sx={{ mt: 3, mb: 2 }}
disabled={isLoading}
>
{isLoading ? <CircularProgress size={24} /> : 'Recover Account'}
</Button>
<Box sx={{ textAlign: 'center' }}>
<Link to="/login">
<Typography variant="body2">Back to Sign In</Typography>
</Link>
</Box>
</Box>
</Paper>
</Box>
</Container>
);
};
export default RecoveryPage;

View file

@ -215,6 +215,23 @@ class ApiService {
return response.data;
}
// ---- Recovery (zero-knowledge) ----
async getRecoveryInfo(email: string): Promise<{ recovery_enabled: boolean; recovery_wrapped_dek?: string; recovery_wrapped_dek_iv?: string }> {
const response = await this.client.get('/auth/recovery-info', { params: { email } });
return response.data;
}
async recoverPassword(email: string, recoveryProof: string, newAuthSecret: string, newWrappedDek?: string, newWrappedDekIv?: string): Promise<void> {
await this.client.post('/auth/recover-password', {
email,
recovery_phrase: recoveryProof,
new_password: newAuthSecret,
new_wrapped_dek: newWrappedDek,
new_wrapped_dek_iv: newWrappedDekIv,
});
}
// ---- Profile (zero-knowledge: opaque encrypted name) ----
async getProfile(): Promise<ProfileWireResponse> {

View file

@ -2,11 +2,16 @@ import { create } from 'zustand';
import { devtools, persist } from 'zustand/middleware';
import {
deriveAuthAndEncKeys,
setupEncryption,
unlockWithPassword,
unlockWithRecovery,
rewrapDek,
setEncKey,
clearEncKey,
getEncKey,
encryptJson,
decryptJson,
type CipherPayload,
} from '../crypto';
import {
User,
@ -31,6 +36,7 @@ interface AuthState {
// Actions
login: (email: string, password: string) => Promise<void>;
register: (username: string, email: string, password: string) => Promise<void>;
recover: (email: string, recoveryPhrase: string, newPassword: string) => Promise<void>;
logout: () => Promise<void>;
clearError: () => void;
loadUser: () => Promise<void>;
@ -118,11 +124,22 @@ export const useAuthStore = create<AuthState>()(
login: async (email: string, password: string) => {
set({ isLoading: true, error: null });
try {
// Zero-knowledge: derive auth secret + encryption key from password.
// Zero-knowledge: derive auth secret (sent to server) + encryption key.
const { authSecret, encKey } = await deriveAuthAndEncKeys(password);
setEncKey(encKey);
// Send the derived auth secret (not the raw password) to the server.
const response = await apiService.login(email, authSecret);
// If the server returned a wrapped DEK, unwrap it with the password.
if (response.wrapped_dek && response.wrapped_dek_iv) {
try {
const { dek } = await unlockWithPassword(password, {
data: response.wrapped_dek,
iv: response.wrapped_dek_iv,
});
setEncKey(dek);
} catch {
// Fallback to the PBKDF2-derived key (Phase 1 compat).
}
}
set({
user: {
user_id: response.user_id,
@ -150,6 +167,9 @@ export const useAuthStore = create<AuthState>()(
try {
const { authSecret, encKey } = await deriveAuthAndEncKeys(password);
setEncKey(encKey);
// For now register uses the Phase 1 key derivation (no recovery phrase
// in the basic register flow). The wrapped-DEK recovery fields are
// optional on the register request.
const response = await apiService.register({
username,
email,
@ -176,6 +196,43 @@ export const useAuthStore = create<AuthState>()(
}
},
recover: async (email: string, recoveryPhrase: string, newPassword: string) => {
set({ isLoading: true, error: null });
try {
// 1. Fetch the recovery-wrapped DEK from the server.
const info = await apiService.getRecoveryInfo(email);
if (!info.recovery_enabled || !info.recovery_wrapped_dek || !info.recovery_wrapped_dek_iv) {
throw new Error('Recovery is not enabled for this account');
}
// 2. Unwrap the DEK using the recovery phrase.
const dek = await unlockWithRecovery(recoveryPhrase, {
data: info.recovery_wrapped_dek,
iv: info.recovery_wrapped_dek_iv,
});
// 3. Re-wrap the DEK under the new password.
const newWrapped = await rewrapDek(dek, newPassword);
// 4. Derive the new auth secret + recovery proof.
const newAuthSecret = (await deriveAuthAndEncKeys(newPassword)).authSecret;
const recoveryProof = (await deriveAuthAndEncKeys(recoveryPhrase)).authSecret;
// 5. Send the recovery request.
await apiService.recoverPassword(
email,
recoveryProof,
newAuthSecret,
newWrapped.data,
newWrapped.iv,
);
set({ isLoading: false });
} catch (error: any) {
clearEncKey();
set({
error: error.message || 'Recovery failed',
isLoading: false,
});
throw error;
}
},
logout: async () => {
clearEncKey();
await apiService.logout();

View file

@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ export interface AuthTokens {
user_id: string;
username: string;
email?: string;
wrapped_dek?: string;
wrapped_dek_iv?: string;
}
export interface LoginRequest {